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1 
Brand Performance Volatility from Marketing 
Spending 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While volatile marketing spending, as opposed to even-level spending, may improve a brand’s 
financial performance, it can also increase the volatility of performance, which is not a desirable 
outcome. This paper analyzes how revenue and cash-flow volatility are influenced by own and 
competitive marketing spending volatility, by the level of marketing spending, by the responsiveness 
to own marketing spending, and by competitive response. From market response theory, the authors 
derive propositions about the influence of these variables on revenue and cash-flow volatility. In 
addition, they extend the Dorfman-Steiner theorem to derive the optimal level and volatility of 
expenditures if volatility effects are taken into account. 
Based on a large sample of 99 pharmaceutical brands in four clinical categories and four European 
countries, the authors test for the empirical relevance of the propositions and assess the magnitude of 
the different sources of marketing-induced performance volatility. The authors find broad support for 
the predicted volatility effects. Volatility elasticities are significant and may be as large as 1.10 for 
cash-flow variance with respect to marketing responsiveness. 
The findings imply that common volatility-increasing marketing practices such as price promotions or 
volatile advertising plans may be effective at the top-line, but could turn out to be ineffective after all 
costs are taken into account. Optimal marketing volatility needs to tradeoff sales effectiveness and 
extra costs due to marketing volatility. 
 
 
Keywords:  Revenue/Cash-Flow Volatility, Marketing Volatility, Econometric Models, Marketing 
Metrics  
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Introduction 
In order to enhance sales impact, marketing practitioners often deploy their resources in spending bursts, 
i.e. regimes characterized by on-again, off-again marketing actions, including advertising campaigns, 
sales promotions and new-product launches. Inasfar as the volatility in such marketing activities causes 
demand/revenues and cash flows to become more volatile, it may have unintended negative consequences 
for the firm. Such effects may occur because managers from different departments do not fully appreciate 
the nature of demand volatility and interpret demand shifts differently. 
Consider the following example from the computer industry (Hanssens 1998). The marketing 
manager of a manufacturer brand orders a sales promotion to stimulate lackluster demand. The dealer 
interprets the temporary sales lift as a true marketplace demand shift and increases orders to boost his 
inventory. The manufacturer’s supply chain manager notices the sharp increase in orders and projects that 
the manufacturer will quickly run out of stock. Consequently, he adjusts production plans to avoid 
potential stockouts. Because the promotion-induced shift in sales was only of a temporary nature, the firm 
may now face additional warehousing and related costs. Similar examples have been described for other 
firms such as automobile manufacturers (Gottfredson and Aspinall 2005). 
The increased demand volatility at the retail level leads to the well-known bullwhip effect (e.g. 
Lee, Padmanabhan & Whang 1997), i.e. increasing demand volatility in the supply chain from 
downstream echelons (retail) to upstream echelons (manufacturing). The effect occurs because 
information transferred in the form of orders among members of a supply chain tends to be distorted and 
may mislead upstream firms in their inventory and production decisions. Lee, Padmanabhan & Whang 
(1997) showed that this effect is not due to a behavioral anomaly, but results from rational and optimizing 
behavior of economic agents in a supply chain. Since the effect amplifies as one moves upstream in the 
supply chain, the volatility of orders or production becomes larger than that of sales or demand caused by 
end customers, with serious cost implications. Excess raw materials cost, additional manufacturing 
expenses, excess warehousing, and additional transportation costs may result in excess cost that may be as 
large as 25% (Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang 1997). As a consequence, a marketing policy that 
stimulates not only the level of sales but also its variance may increase these costs.  
In addition, demand volatility creates challenges for the management of limited resources such as 
labor force, machine equipment, and storage capacity. Opportunity costs arise due to unused capacities in 
periods of lower demand. Extra costs result from the overuse of resources due to equipment wearout, 
overwork of labor force, extra compensation for overtime, etc. In particular, employees in departments 
associated with sales, customer service and order fulfillment are directly impacted by demand 
fluctuations. Severe volatility may necessitate frequent hiring, firing and re-hiring of employees, which is 
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costly due to training and severance pay.  This will incur productivity losses due to employee idleness in 
trough periods, and supplementary costs (e.g., payment for overtime) in peak periods.  
In addition to these observable economic effects of demand volatility, there are also motivational 
consequences. According to expectancy theory in organizational behavior (e.g., Steel and König 2006), 
worker motivation and morale will be lower when employees fail to perceive a linkage between their 
personal effort and the firm’s performance. Thus if recurring marketing-induced volatility in the firm’s 
revenue streams cannot be remedied, non-marketing employee motivation and loyalty will suffer, which 
can be costly for a firm. Additionally, if sales volatility results in either over-shooting or under-shooting 
of company revenue targets, that will adversely affect the compensation of sales people and executives in 
the firm (Misra and Nair 2011). Likewise, sales volatility may harm the relationship between 
manufacturers and retailers because it makes the order planning process more difficult and may force the 
manufacturer to make tough choices if orders exceed supply (Adelman and Mersereau 2013). 
Marketing volatility may also increase cash-flow volatility, leading to higher opportunity costs 
and greater financing costs. Consider an advertising plan with alternating periods of high and low activity, 
which results in demand and cash-flow peaks and troughs. The negative consequences of such cash-flow 
volatility have been well recognized in the finance literature. In particular, a greater variability of cash 
flows forces management to hold larger cash reserves (Opler et al., 1999). In the Appendix, we 
demonstrate how a more volatile spending plan of a given advertising budget leads to extra financing 
costs because it requires mobilizing more capital compared to an even-spending plan. The illustrative 
example shows that, even though revenues and cash flows are higher under the volatile spending plan, the 
extra costs may outweigh the sales advantage. 
However, it should be noted that volatility is not bad per se. If it is driven by an upward sales 
trend, for example, then it might even be desirable. The unexpected variation around the forecasted trend 
line is the kind of volatility that is undesirable. By better understanding the potential marketing sources of 
such volatility, decision makers can reduce the uncertainty around their sales and cash flow predictions. 
Marketing literature. Revenue or cash-flow volatility has traditionally not been of major concern 
to marketers. As long as marketing managers are unaware of the potential negative effects of their 
marketing policies, they have no incentive to reduce the resulting revenue and cash-flow volatility. Thus, 
there may be a potential conflict between sales-impact maximization (a typical marketing objective) and 
stable revenue and cash-flow generation (typical operations and financial management objectives). The 
marketing literature, however, is virtually silent about the potential performance volatility induced by 
marketing-mix activities. To our knowledge, only two empirical studies have addressed the relationship 
between marketing-mix activities and revenue/cash-flow volatility to date. Raju (1992) examines the 
drivers of category sales variability and finds that the magnitude of discounts is positively associated with 
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sales volatility. Vakratsas (2008) shows that marketing-mix variables including price, advertising, and 
distribution affect market-share volatility. Given that volatility in sales and cash flows may have 
significant, unfavorable side effects, however, we need a deeper understanding of how marketing 
activities drive these performance volatilities. 
Contributions. This study focuses on the brand level and examines the effects of the volatility of 
marketing expenditures, the level of marketing expenditures, and customer responsiveness to marketing 
expenditures, both theoretically and empirically. Some of these relations are relatively transparent; for 
example more volatile spending and higher responsiveness should translate into higher revenue and cash-
flow volatility because of the functional relationship between sales and marketing spending. However, 
Raju’s (1992) finding that a higher frequency of promotional actions leads to lower sales volatility is 
counter to this intuition. In our theoretical analysis, we show that the intuition is accurate for the single-
firm scenario but not necessarily true for a competitive scenario. Depending on the structure and intensity 
of competitive interaction, theory predicts the reverse outcome found by Raju (1992). Other effects, such 
as the impact of the spending level on cash-flow volatility, are not easy to predict without a deeper 
theoretical understanding. In addition, we develop results on the optimal spending level and the optimal 
spending volatility under Nash competition that extend the well-established Dorfman-Steiner theorem to 
the volatility case. Thus, our study provides the first in-depth theoretical analysis of the volatility effects 
of marketing spending policy under competition. 
We test the predictions from theory with a large dataset of 99 pharmaceutical brands from four 
European countries and four categories. The pharmaceutical industry is especially relevant because 
marketing expenditures are substantial and show high volatility. Our empirical analysis makes two 
contributions. First, it informs whether the predicted volatility effects hold under real market conditions. 
Second, it enables us to quantify the magnitude of these effects. For this reason, we obtain elasticity 
estimates for the volatility relations. Decision makers would only care about the effects if they were of 
practical significance. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We first develop propositions about the 
effects of marketing spending on brand performance volatility. Next, we describe our research 
methodology to measure the effects in an empirical study. We present empirical results and discuss the 
theoretical and managerial implications of our findings. The article concludes with a synthesis of the 
findings, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
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Theory 
Our conceptual development is rooted in market response theory. We start from the premise that sales 
follow a concave relationship with marketing expenditures. A concave response function is theoretically 
attractive because it implies diminishing returns, which are a prerequisite for marketing budget 
optimization. It is by far the most frequent type of response function encountered in empirical research 
(Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2001). Since a concave log-log response model also turns out to best 
represent our data, our theory development is fully consistent with the subsequent empirical analysis. 
Finally, the results may be generalized to other types of response, such as an S-shaped or a differential 
stimulus response. Assuming rational, profit-maximizing behavior, budgets only vary within the concave 
zone of these functions, which is the only assumption we make. 
By varying conditions such as responsiveness to marketing, we derive propositions on our focal 
volatility variables. Specifically, we consider two measures of volatility: the variance and the range (i.e. 
the difference between maximum and minimum values) of marketing expenditures, revenues, and cash 
flows. Variance is a common measure of variability and we will focus on this variable to derive our 
propositions. Range is another useful metric of volatility, which is often used in the finance literature 
(e.g., Alizadeh, Brandt and Diebold 2002). 
 
Impact of Own Marketing on Performance Volatility 
We start the discussion of volatility effects with the impact of own marketing spending behavior on the 
volatility of revenues, followed by its effects on the volatility of cash flows. Our general argument is that 
the volatility, the average level and the sales responsiveness of marketing expenditures together affect the 
volatility of revenues and cash flows. By sales responsiveness we mean the lift in sales that can be 
associated with an increase in marketing expenditures. It is measured by the slope parameter of the 
response function. 
In the theoretical analysis, we assume that both own marketing and competitive marketing 
expenditures influence sales. The impact of competitive marketing on sales is measured by its cross-
effect. Because of potential competitive interactions, there is a connection between own marketing 
expenditures and competitive expenditures that needs to be reflected in the volatility analysis. The 
correlation between own and competitive expenditures is the observable outcome of this interaction. In 
addition, we assume that the volatility of own marketing expenditures may have an effect on sales. This 
effect models the potential benefits of volatile marketing expenditures. 
Definitions and Assumptions. Let Q[MKT, CMKT, Var(MKT)] measure unit sales that depends 
on own marketing expenditures, MKT, the cumulative marketing expenditures by competitors, CMKT, 
and the variance of own marketing expenditures, Var(MKT). Q is a nonlinear, twice differentiable 
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function with  and . measures the marginal own demand effect with 
respect to MKT. Assuming profit maximization together with S-shaped response functions, as an example, 
implies that firms operate in the concave part of the response function. Hence, our assumption about 
still holds.  captures the cross-effect of competitive expenditures, CMKT, on demand. 
This effect may be substitutive ( ) or market expanding ( ). Let ε = Q' ⋅ MKT/Q denote the 
elasticity of sales with respect to own marketing expenditures and  be the cross-
elasticity with respect to competitive expenditures. 
measures the effect of expenditure volatility on sales. The marginal effect 
can be positive or zero depending on the type of response function assumed. The literature on advertising 
pulsing proposes various demand specifications (e.g., S-shaped market response, differential stimulus) 
that give rise to a positive effect of volatile marketing spending on sales (e.g., Simon 1982; Freimer and 
Horsky 2012). Our specification is very general in that we do not make any assumption about the specific 
demand conditions that lead to higher sales from expenditure volatility. We assume diminishing returns to 
scale, i.e. , if the marginal effect is strictly positive. 
Using a linear Taylor series approximation with mean expenditures levels µ and µc for own and 
competitive expenditures, respectively, and θ for an arbitrary variance level of own marketing 
expenditures as expansion points gives: 
 (1) 
Revenues, RV, and cash flows, CF, are given by the following expressions 
  (2) 
, (3) 
where P measures unit price and C denotes unit cost. From Equation (1) together with (2) and (3), we 
obtain the variance of revenues 
  (4)
 
and the variance of cash flows 
( ) 0Q MKT′ > ( ) 0Q MKT′′ < Q′
( )Q MKT′′ cQ′
0cQ′ < 0cQ′ >
c cQ CMKT Qε ′= ⋅
 ′
QVar Var MKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≥ 0
 ′′
QVar Var MKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0
 
Q MKT ,CMKT ,Var MKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≅ Q µ,µc ,θ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + ′Q µ( )MKT − ′Q µ( )µ + ′Qc µc( )CMKT
− ′Qc µc( )µc + ′QVar θ( )Var MKT( )− ′QVar θ( )θ
 
RV = P ⋅Q MKT ,CMKT ,Var MKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
 
CF = P − C( ) ⋅Q MKT ,CMKT ,Var MKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − MKT
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 22 2
1
2 2
,
2 ,
c c
c c
Var RV MKT CMKT P Q Var MKT P Q Var CMKT
P Q Q Var MKT Var CMKT
µ µ
ρ µ µ
′ ′≅ +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
′ ′+ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
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 (5) 
where ρ measures the correlation between own and competitive marketing expenditures. Note that, while 
marketing expenditure volatility may impact sales, it has no relevance for deriving the variance equations 
above. The variances of revenues, cash flows, and marketing expenditures are based on the same time 
span. Hence, there is no variation in Var(MKT). 
From Dorfman and Steiner (1954), we know that the profit-maximizing marketing budget must 
satisfy the first-order condition , where the asterisk indicates that variables are at 
their optimum. This relation also holds in a competitive Nash equilibrium (Fischer et al. 2011), where ε* 
and Q* reflect equilibrium values and depend on equilibrium competitive expenditures as defined in (1). 
We will use µ*, the optimal equilibrium mean expenditure level, as a useful reference point in the 
subsequent analysis. Let us also introduce , the near-optimal expenditure level that is derived from 
current parameter values according to 
  (6) 
Fischer et al. (2011) show that, using this relation as a periodic rule to determine the optimal budget under 
Nash competition,  quickly converges to the true optimum. In addition, we use the coefficient of 
variation as a normalized measure of the volatility of own and competitive marketing expenditures. They 
are defined as CV = SD(MKT)/µ and CVc = SD(CMKT)/µc, where CV denotes the coefficient of variation 
and SD is the standard deviation. 
Finally, we assume that unit profit contribution and mean expenditure levels for own and 
competitive marketing are always strictly positive, i.e. (P-C),µ, µc > 0, and therefore Var(CMKT) > 0 and 
Var(MKT) > 0. We also assume Q'(MKT) ≠ 0 and ≠ 0. 
Effects on Revenue Volatility. We derive the following propositions on revenue volatility. 
PROPOSITION 1A. Ceteris paribus, a higher variance of own expenditures increases the variance 
of revenues if . 
PROPOSITION 1B. Ceteris paribus, a higher mean level of own expenditures decreases the 
variance of revenues if . 
PROPOSITION 1C. Ceteris paribus, a higher marketing responsiveness increases the variance of 
revenues if . 
 
Var CF MKT ,CMKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≅ P − C( ) ′Q µ( )−1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
Var MKT( ) + P − C( )2 ′Qc µc( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
Var CMKT( )
+2 P − C( )2 ρ ′Q µ( ) ′Qc µc( ) Var MKT( )Var CMKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
1
2 ,
( )MKT P C Qε∗ ∗ ∗= −
 µ
 
µ = ε P −C( )Q
 µ
( )cQ CMKT′
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
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PROOFS. See Appendix. ¨ 
Apparently, the postulated effects of revenue volatility depend on the condition that
. At first glance, this result may appear surprising, as revenues always increase with 
own expenditures, albeit at a decreasing rate. Hence, we would expect that higher own expenditure 
variance also always translates into higher revenue variance, consistent with the monotonic shape of the 
response function. In fact, the intuition is not wrong if we consider a situation without competition. Then, 
ρ = 0, and we have the condition ε CV > 0, which is always satisfied since ε and CV > 0. Under 
competition, however, revenues are also affected by competitive actions. Higher expenditure volatility, as 
an example, does not necessarily increase the volatility of revenues but may in fact decrease it. Whether 
this situation arises depends on the type and intensity of competitive interaction. 
We note that there is always a positive effect on revenue volatility if competitive behavior is 
accommodating (ρ < 0) and cross-effects are substitutive (εc < 0), or if competitive behavior is retaliatory 
(counteractive) (ρ > 0) and cross-effects are market-expanding (εc > 0). The reality in many competitive 
markets, however, is that cross-effects are substitutive (εc < 0) and competitive interaction is retaliatory  
(ρ > 0). A (counterintuitive) negative effect on revenue volatility does occur in that situation if 
. This inequality implies that the demand-effective volatility of competitive 
expenditures, as represented by εc CVc, must be higher than the demand-effective volatility of own 
expenditures, ε CV. It increases with the strength of the cross-effect and the normalized variance of 
competitive expenditures. In addition, own and competitive expenditures must be positively correlated.  
This competitive interaction is the reason why a higher variance in own expenditures entails a competitive 
reaction that may overcompensate the volatility induced by own expenditure volatility. 
Effects on Cash-Flow Volatility. The results on revenue volatility cannot be automatically 
transferred to cash-flow volatility since an increase (decrease) in revenues is also associated with an 
increase (decrease) in costs.  
PROPOSITION 2A. Ceteris paribus, a higher variance of own expenditures increases the variance 
of cash flows if . 
PROOF. See Appendix. ¨ 
Cash-flow volatility always increases if ρ = 0, i.e., if there is no competitive interaction. 
Consistent with the effect on revenue volatility, however, a positive effect on cash-flow volatility is not 
universally guaranteed under regular competitive conditions (ρ  > 0 and εc < 0). 
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
c cCV CVρ ε ε− >
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
> −ρ
εc CVc
ε CV
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COROLLARY 1. Under regular competitive conditions (ρ  > 0 and εc < 0), there is always an 
expenditure level close enough to the optimal Dorfman-Steiner level when higher variance of own 
expenditures leads to a lower variance of cash flows. 
PROOF. See Appendix. ¨ 
This result can be explained intuitively from the flat maximum principle (e.g. Tull et al. 1986), 
i.e. we know that the cash-flow curve is flat around the optimum. A large variation of marketing 
expenditures is associated with only a small variation in cash flows. While cash-flow variance always 
increases if competitors do not react, retaliatory behavior and substitutive effects can overcompensate 
changes in cash flows if they are small, as is the case around the maximum. As a result, cash-flow 
variance decreases. 
PROPOSITION 2B. Ceteris paribus, the variance of cash flows follows a U-shape with higher mean 
levels of marketing expenditures if . 
PROOF. See Appendix. ¨ 
Mathematically, this proposition implies that the first derivative of Equation (5) has a root, which 
defines the minimum of cash-flow variance. In contrast to the variance of revenues, the relationship 
between the variance of cash flows and the mean expenditure level is no longer monotonic. The following 
corollary characterizes this relationship more precisely. 
COROLLARY 2. Under regular competitive conditions (ρ  > 0 and εc < 0), the variance of cash 
flows starts to increase at a level lower than the optimal Dorfman-Steiner level. 
PROOF. See Appendix. ¨ 
Interestingly, under regular competitive conditions, the optimal Dorfman-Steiner level of 
marketing expenditures is associated with lower variance in revenues but higher variance of cash flows, 
compared to a lower expenditure level. Note that the Dorfman-Steiner theorem ignores the effects of 
expenditure volatility on sales and costs. We extend this theorem later and derive a different optimal 
mean expenditure level. Corollary 2 still holds under these conditions. 
PROPOSITION 2C. Ceteris paribus, a higher marketing responsiveness increases the variance of 
cash flows if  and . For 
, the variance of cash flows decreases with a higher marketing 
responsiveness. 
PROOF. See Appendix. ¨ 
Proposition 2C states that the effect of an increased marketing responsiveness on cash-flow 
volatility depends on the level of marketing expenditures. In fact, this interaction effect with the level of 
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
 
µ < µ εCV + ρεc CVc( ) εCV c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
 
µ > µ εCV + ρεc CVc( ) εCV
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marketing expenditures is non-monotonic. While cash-flow volatility generally increases with higher 
marketing responsiveness, this relation turns into the opposite at a point close to the optimal expenditure 
level. One explanation for this effect is that every additional dollar spent beyond the optimal level incurs a 
loss. The loss, however, is less the greater the responsiveness of demand, i.e. the cash-flow function is 
less steep. Therefore, (negative) cash flows vary to a lesser extent with expenditures beyond the profit-
maximizing level if sales responsiveness is larger. 
 
Impact of Competitive Marketing and Interaction on Performance Volatility 
We now turn our focus to two effects that arise from competitive interaction. Specifically, we consider the 
impact of the volatility of competitive expenditures and the correlation between own and competitive 
expenditures on revenue and cash-flow volatility. 
Competitive-expenditure volatility. The effects of competitive-expenditure variance are the 
same on revenue and cash-flow variance. The conditions for the direction of the effects, however, are 
different depending on the type of cross-effect. Specifically, we specify the following conditions under 
which propositions 3A and 3B hold: 
If εc < 0  and , then     (7a) 
If εc > 0  and , then     (7b) 
PROPOSITION 3A. Ceteris paribus, a higher variance of competitive expenditures increases the 
variance of own revenues. 
PROPOSITION 3B. Ceteris paribus, a higher variance of competitive expenditures increases the 
variance of own cash flows. 
PROOFS. See Appendix. ¨ 
The effects of competitive-expenditure volatility are symmetric to the effect of own-expenditure 
volatility on revenue volatility (see proposition 1A again). Whether the variance of revenues and cash 
flows increases with higher competitive-expenditure variance depends on the strengths of demand-
effective volatilities and the type and intensity of competitive interaction. If there is no interaction, i.e.  
ρ = 0, we have the apparent result that volatility in our focal variables always increases. It does not 
depend on the direction of the cross-effect because variance itself has no directional meaning. The picture 
changes when we consider a situation with competitive interaction. Under regular competitive conditions 
(ρ  > 0 and εc < 0), both sides of inequality (7a) are positive. It is not guaranteed that this inequality 
always holds. Hence, there may be conditions when a greater variance in competitive expenditures in fact 
decreases the variance of own revenues and cash flows, which is counterintuitive but a direct implication 
of propositions 3A and 3B. 
 εc CVc < −ρεCV
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
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How can we explain this finding? If own effect and (substitutive) cross-effect are in opposition to 
each other, a retaliatory firm behavior may result in a competitive reaction that overcompensates the 
volatility induced by competitive-expenditure volatility. Such an outcome is more likely to occur if the 
cross-effect is small relative to the own effect and if competitive interaction is strong (i.e., ρ → 1). To see 
this, reverse the inequality condition (7a) and rearrange it to . A smaller ratio  
⎢εC⎥ / ε and a larger ρ are more likely to satisfy this inequality. 
Competitive interaction. The propositions on the effects of the correlation between own and 
competitive marketing expenditures on revenue and cash-flow volatility are identical. 
PROPOSITION 4A. Ceteris paribus, a stronger (positive) correlation between own and competitive 
marketing expenditures increases the variance of revenues if εc > 0. The variance of revenues decreases if 
εc < 0. 
PROPOSITION 4B. Ceteris paribus, a stronger (positive) correlation between own and competitive 
marketing expenditures increases the variance of cash flows if εc > 0. The variance of cash flows 
decreases if εc < 0. 
PROOFS. See Appendix. ¨ 
Our last propositions state that an increase (decrease) in retaliatory (accommodating) competitive 
behavior (dρ > 0) increases the variance in revenues and cash flows if cross-effects are market-expanding. 
It decreases volatilities of the focal variables if cross-effects are substitutive. These results follow directly 
from the properties of the response function. Substitutive competitive expenditures, for example, reduce 
own sales and therefore compensate an increase in sales due to larger own expenditures. If competitive 
expenditures follow own expenditures more closely, i.e. ρ is higher, the compensation effect is greater and 
variance in sales declines. 
 
Summary of Propositions on Brand Performance Volatility 
Table 1 summarizes our propositions on brand performance variance. These propositions characterize the 
performance volatility effects under general conditions, i.e. we do not make any specific assumption 
about the structure of demand, competition, or rational firm behavior. Our theoretical analysis reveals a 
number of important, sometimes counterintuitive insights. First, we note that the variance, the level, and 
the sales responsiveness of own expenditures do impact the volatility of revenues and cash flows. Second, 
the effects are different for revenue and cash-flow volatility. Since marketing expenditures both positively 
and negatively affect cash flows, the relationship with the variance of cash flows is often non-monotonic. 
Third, while the direction of the volatility effects is usually well defined for a situation without 
competitive interaction, it is not at all clear under competitive conditions, producing sometimes 
 εC ε < ρ CV CVC
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counterintuitive results. Generally, under regular competitive conditions with substitutive cross-effects 
and retaliatory firm behavior, the direction of volatility effects depends on the magnitude of demand 
effects and the intensity of competition. Particularly, a larger variance in own and competitive marketing 
expenditures may lead to less volatile revenues and/or cash flows. This result is consistent with the 
observation that market shares are surprisingly stable in many FMCG markets despite the heavy intensity 
of promotional and advertising activities. 
== Insert Table 1 about here == 
 
Optimal Mean Expenditure Level and Volatility 
We now extend our analytical model to derive general optimality conditions that account for performance 
volatility effects. Following our previous analysis, we adopt a theoretical modeling approach. Our 
theoretical normative model represents the set of assumptions that we used to describe the marketing 
environment at the outset and identifies conditions under which the objective function is optimized. We 
assume that the firm decides about its optimal marketing spending policy, which we characterize in terms 
of its mean, µ, and variance, [! Var(MKT)]. While our theoretical model may not inform about the 
exact structure of the optimal spending plan, it does not require specifying a particular demand function 
and thus allows for truly generalizable results about the optimality conditions. 
Consistent with our introductory discussion of the cost implications of performance volatility, we 
introduce w, which measures the cost of one additional unit of revenue variance, and r, which measures 
the financing cost of one additional unit of cash-flow variance. We assume w and r to be constant. Thus, 
w and r measure the marginal cost of revenue and cash-flow volatility. 
Assume management wants to maximize profit Π for its brand and sets the marketing budget 
independently of its competitors by taking the competitor budgets as given (Nash competition): 
,  (8) 
where  and  denote variance in revenues and cash flows, respectively, and f measures fixed cost. 
The following first-order conditions need to be satisfied in a competitive equilibrium (see Appendix): 
,   (9a) 
,  (9b) 
 σ MKT
2
 
max
µ ,σ MKT
2
  Π = P −C( )Q µ,σ MKT2 ,CMKT( )− µ − wσ RV2 − rσ CF2 − f
 σ RV
2
 σ CF
2
 
∂Π
∂µ
= P −C( ) ∂Q∂µ −1− w+ rm m+ ρQ ,MKT
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where m measures the profit margin [in percent], ρQ,MKT represents the correlation between unit sales and 
own marketing expenditures, and all other terms are defined as earlier. 
Note that  defines the classical Dorfman-Steiner (DS) solution for 
the optimal marketing expenditure level, where the asterisk means that variables are at their optimum. 
Since the classical theorem does not consider the effects of expenditure volatility, there are no results on 
that decision variable. Based on the conditions (9a) and (9b), we can characterize the optimal mean 
expenditure level and variance relative to the DS result. In the following, we assume w > 0 and r = 0 
when deriving these optimality results. This assumption is not very restrictive and helps to isolate the 
differences with respect to the DS solution. Indeed, compared with the increased cost due to revenue 
volatility, which may be as large as 25% according to Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang (1997), the pure 
additional financing cost due to cash-flow volatility is negligible.1 The essential insights do not change if 
we relax this assumption. For the optimal mean expenditure level under volatile marketing spending, we 
obtain the following general result: 
THEOREM 1.  .  
PROOF. See Appendix. ¨ 
The term measures the elasticity of sales w.r.t. expenditure volatility, represents the 
elasticity of revenue volatility w.r.t. expenditure level and measures the elasticity of revenue 
volatility w.r.t. expenditure volatility. is always greater than zero because . From 
propositions 1A and 1B, it follows that . Hence, we derive the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5A. Provided the impact of variance of own marketing expenditures on brand sales 
is positive, the optimal mean expenditure level is always higher than the optimal Dorfman-Steiner level if 
the firm follows a volatile marketing expenditure policy. 
PROOF. As shown above. ¨ 
THEOREM 1 is a generalization of the DS theorem that takes the effects of volatile marketing 
spending, e.g., advertising pulsing, into account. If expenditure volatility has no effect on sales, 
                                                
1 Our illustrative example in the Appendix implies that r ≈ .001 US$. In addition, treasury management may try to 
lower this cost even further by diversification. Given the optimal expenditure variance for each brand, management 
could coordinate the expenditure plans for the brands in a way that overall cash-flow volatility is reduced. 
 
MKT ∗ = µ∗ = εQ ,µ
∗ P −C( )Q∗
 
µ∗
P −C( )Q∗ = εQ ,µ
∗
Dorfman-Steiner solution
  
− ε
Q ,σ MKT
2
∗
ε
σ RV
2 ,µ
∗
ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2
∗
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
Volatility markup
  
 
ε
Q ,σ MKT
2
∗
 
ε
σ RV
2 ,µ
∗
 
ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2
∗
 
ε
Q ,σ MKT
2
∗
 ′
Q σ MKT
2( ) > 0
 
ε
σ RV
2 ,µ
∗ ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2
∗ < 0
 
 
 
14 
, the expression reduces to the classical DS solution. If  the optimal budget is 
always higher. Various performance volatility effects define the magnitude of the increase.  Ceteris 
paribus, the increase is higher when sales respond strongly to expenditure volatility. The increase is 
smaller if this volatility translates into higher revenue volatility. This influence, however, is alleviated by 
the responsiveness of revenue volatility to the expenditure level. Interestingly, the marginal cost of 
revenue volatility does not play a role in determining the optimal budget according to THEOREM 1. 
To summarize, if expenditure volatility does have an incremental sales effect, marketing 
management should operate at a higher spend level compared to a situation where it does not have an 
incremental effect. Hence, despite the additional volatility cost, the increase in sales effectiveness due to 
expenditure volatility is synergistic. This result is mainly driven by the fact that a higher expenditure level 
attenuates the cost increase from expenditure volatility, (see proposition 1B). 
For the optimal level of expenditure volatility, we obtain the following theorem and proposition: 
THEOREM 2. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 5B. Provided the impact of own marketing expenditures on brand sales is positive, a 
volatile expenditure policy is always optimal if there is no competitive interaction among firms. In all 
other cases, a volatile marketing expenditure policy is only optimal if . 
PROOF. Note the variance of marketing expenditures in THEOREM 2 is strictly positive if 
. This implies that the inequality condition in proposition 1A must hold. Rearranging 
terms leads to the condition as stated in proposition 5B. If there is no competitive interaction among firms, 
then ρ = 0 and therefore the condition is always satisfied. ¨ 
Proposition 5B highlights that a volatile marketing expenditure policy is not optimal under all 
circumstances, even though sales may respond strongly to expenditure volatility. Provided expenditure 
volatility positively impacts sales, firms should always employ a volatile policy if there is no competitive 
interaction. But if they actively compete with each other, the resulting equilibrium budgets and 
expenditure volatilities need to satisfy the condition in 5B. Note that this condition is equivalent to the 
condition in proposition 1A. This, in turn, implies that the counterintuitive negative effect of own 
expenditure volatility on revenue volatility cannot occur in a market where firms follow a rational Nash 
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behavior. We discuss further implications of optimal behavior for the performance volatility effects in 
more detail in the next section. 
THEOREM 2 also shows that the optimal variance in own marketing expenditures increases with 
its relative impact on sales, but it decreases in the marginal cost of revenue volatility and the marginal 
effect of expenditure volatility on revenue volatility. It emphasizes our core message: volatile marketing 
spending may offer an opportunity to increase sales effectiveness. However, it is also important to 
consider the extra costs of such behavior, which have typically been ignored. 
  
Effects on Brand Performance Volatility under Rational Firm Behavior 
We now revisit the brand performance volatility effects of Table 1 by assuming that firms follow a 
rational, competitive Nash behavior (proofs are provided in the Appendix). Table 2 shows that the 
volatility effects can be quite different from those derived under general conditions (see Table 1 again). 
Higher own-expenditure variance and marketing responsiveness always increase revenue volatility. A 
higher mean level of expenditures always lowers revenue volatility. The counterintuitive finding that 
greater own-expenditure volatility and higher responsiveness may reduce the variance of revenues is 
therefore not consistent with rational firm behavior.   
We also note there are fewer restrictions on the relations between expenditure level and 
responsiveness, respectively, and cash-flow variance. The relation between cash-flow variance and 
expenditure level always follows a U-shape. The direction of the effect of responsiveness on cash-flow 
variance depends on the expenditure level and is consistent with an inverted U-shape. The variance of 
cash flows increases with higher responsiveness for lower expenditure levels. However, the direction of 
the effect changes for higher expenditure levels, such as those beyond the optimal level, because higher 
responsiveness shields against losses from overspending. Finally, we note that, consistent with Table 1, 
larger expenditure volatility usually increases volatility in cash flows, but not for all expenditure levels. 
Corollary 1 still holds under rational firm behavior, i.e. cash-flow variance declines if the expenditure 
level is very close to its optimal level. 
== Insert Table 2 about here == 
Consistent with the results under general conditions, our competitor behavior variables impact the 
variances of revenues and cash flows in the same direction. A stronger correlation of own and competitive 
expenditures decreases (increases) brand performance volatility if the cross-effect is negative (positive). 
The direction of the effect of competitive expenditure volatility also depends on the sign of the cross-
effect. In addition, we need to consider the type of competitive interaction. Consistent with intuition, 
brand performance volatility always increases for positively (negatively) correlated own and competitive 
expenditures and market-expanding (substitutive) cross-effects and if expenditures are not correlated at 
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all. For substitutive (market-expanding) cross-effects and retaliatory (accommodating) competitive 
interaction, however, performance volatility may increase or decrease with higher competitive 
expenditure volatility. Whether a negative volatility effect exists depends on the magnitude of demand 
effects and the intensity of competitive interaction. It is more likely for relatively small, substitutive 
cross-effects and strong competitive interaction. Most importantly, this result is consistent with rational 
firm behavior. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we predict and find a negative impact of competitive-
expenditure volatility on performance volatility. 
 
Extension to Dynamic Sales Effects 
Brand Performance Volatility Effects. We have considered only static problems so far. However, 
marketing expenditures frequently involve carryover effects. The Nerlove-Arrow (1962) model provides a 
parsimonious but powerful way to model marketing dynamics. Let S denote the brand’s own marketing 
stock and SC the competitive marketing stock, respectively, and let sales be expressed in terms of these 
stock variables, i.e. Q[S, SC, Var(MKT)]. The marketing stock in period t evolves according to the 
process: 
 ,  (10) 
where λ measures the carryover coefficient and all other terms are defined as earlier. We assume the same 
process for competitive expenditures, though the carryover coefficient might be different. It is 
straightforward to show that the structure of the variance equations (4) and (5) does not change. The only 
difference is that variances, means, and responsiveness parameters now refer to marketing stocks instead 
of expenditures. For this reason, all propositions and corollaries derived earlier still hold; they are just 
expressed in stock quantities. Most importantly, they also hold with respect to expenditures because the 
mean, the variance, and the responsiveness of a marketing stock are only a scaled version of the 
respective expenditure quantities (see Appendix for the proofs). For example, consider the variance of 
own marketing stock: 
 , (11) 
 where ρAR(1) denotes the autocorrelation coefficient of the stock variable. 
Optimal marketing spending. It can also be shown that the propositions on the optimal levels of 
marketing expenditures and volatility do not change under the assumption of a dynamic sales response 
function. Given the process of goodwill accumulation and depreciation, we assume that the firm 
maximizes the discounted profit under Nash competition. The optimal policy can be found by applying 
the calculus of variations to solve the dynamic optimization problem (see Appendix). 
 St = λSt−1 + MKTt ,   with 0 ≤ λ ≤1
 
Var S( ) = 1
1+ λ 2 − 2λρAR(1)
Var MKT( )
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While Theorem 2 does not change, the optimal level of marketing expenditures needs to satisfy 
the following condition (extended form of Theorem 1): 
 , (12)  
where φ measures the decay coefficient of the differential equation for the marketing stock and d is the 
discount rate. If φ = 1 (there is no marketing carryover) and d = 0 (no discounting), expression (12) 
reduces to Theorem 1, the optimal expenditure level of the static case. An extension to the Dorfman-
Steiner solution under dynamic profit maximization is given by the first term. The second term measures 
the markup if we take the effect of expenditure volatility on sales into account ( ). Again, the 
markup results in a larger optimal budget under volatility consideration compared to the Dorfman-Steiner 
solution. Hence, our major result from the static case extends to the dynamic case. 
 
Data 
We use data from several pharmaceutical markets to test our propositions and estimate the magnitude of 
the performance volatility effects under real market conditions. Data on prescription drugs from two 
therapeutic areas (cardio-vascular and gastro-intestinal) that cover four product categories are available. 
Two categories, calcium channel blockers and ACE inhibitors, comprise drugs for the treatment of cardio-
vascular diseases. Drugs in the two other categories, H2 antagonists and proton pump inhibitors, are used 
in gastro-intestinal therapies.  These four categories are among the largest prescription-drug categories. 
They differ in their therapeutic principles to treat diseases like hypertension or acid related gastro-
intestinal disorders. Data, collected by IMS Health, are available on a quarterly basis for a time period of 
10 years (1987-1996) covering the growth and maturity phases of the analyzed categories. They include 
unit sales (normalized over different application forms of the drug and transformed into daily dosages by 
a brand-specific dosage factor), revenues, and aggregate marketing expenditures on detailing, journal 
advertising and other communications media. Detailing has the lion’s share in expenditures with more 
than 90%. Monetary values are in 1996 US$ and have been deflated by country-specific consumption 
price indices. The data cover four European countries: France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, and comprise 
sixteen product markets (4 categories × 4 countries). We analyze data on 99 brands, which were marketed 
by 26 pharmaceutical firms. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation equations. We 
provide variable correlations in the Appendix. Revenues average about $9.2 million per quarter, cash 
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flows are about $5.0 million, and average marketing spending amounts to about $1.0 million. There is 
also considerable variation in the data across brands and time, as indicated by the standard deviations and 
the volatility measures in Table 3. Volatility is particularly high with respect to marketing spending. 
Moving variance is about $151.1 million (or $0.4 million in terms of standard deviation) and moving 
range is about $0.8 million, virtually as high as the mean spending. We report on the operationalization of 
these variables subsequently. Plots of marketing spending over time (not shown) reveal substantial 
volatility for many brands in our sample. 
=== Insert Table 3 about here === 
A groupwise analysis provides first evidence on the validity of our theoretical findings (see Table 
4). For this purpose, we build two groups of brands with either low or high values for our volatility driver 
variables. A brand is assigned to the “low” (“high”) group if the value for the respective variable is below 
(above) the sample average. T-tests on the difference between group means show that the variance of 
revenues and cash flows differs significantly (p < .05) between the two groups for all but one variable 
(level of expenditures). The differences are consistent with our results from the theoretical analysis. 
=== Insert Table 4 about here === 
Methodology 
In order to test our propositions 1A to 4A and quantify the magnitude of performance volatility effects 
under real market conditions, we estimate two types of models: (1) a brand sales model and (2) a 
volatility model. The brand sales model is an auxiliary model that provides input for the volatility model, 
which we eventually use to test our propositions. 
Step 1. We apply the brand sales model to our sample and estimate sales effects of own and 
competitive marketing expenditures. Together with other sample characteristics these sales effects help 
predict the performance volatility effects. In principle, we could use the calibrated brand sales model to 
test our propositions. However, this test is not very powerful, as using the estimated response coefficients 
results in predictions for volatility effects that are subject to large standard errors. 
Step 2. We therefore set up volatility models for revenues and cash flows that directly measure 
the postulated performance volatility effects. Specifically, we regress both revenue and cash-flow 
volatility on our focal predictor variables such as marketing-expenditure volatility. The estimated 
response coefficients from these models provide the basis for testing our propositions. Estimation results 
from the first step are incorporated into the volatility models in two ways. First, the responsiveness 
estimates are used as predictor variables. Second, we use the brand sales model to remove the effects of 
exogenous factors such as seasonality and trend from the brand sales time series. Such factors are outside 
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the control of management and are therefore not relevant for the study of marketing spending impact on 
volatility. Brand expenditures are not subject to trend or seasonality, as revealed by specification tests. 
 
Market Response Model 
Specification. Following recent research on pharmaceuticals (e.g., Fischer and Albers 2010), we 
specify a log-log sales response model for each of the two therapeutic areas (cardio-vascular drugs and 
gastro-intestinal drugs). Let sales of drug i∈Ik, with Ik as country-specific index set, in country k∈K, with 
K=4, and in period t∈Ti, with Ti as brand-specific index set, be defined as follows: 
 (13) 
where GDP measures the gross domestic product, ET denotes the elapsed time since launch of the brand, 
SD is a quarterly seasonal dummy variable, CTY is a country dummy variable, and all other terms are 
defined as earlier. The disturbance term u shows an autoregressive structure of second order, where ϕ  is 
an autocorrelation coefficient, and η is a white-noise error term with zero mean and variance . α  and 
β  are parameter vectors to be estimated.  
We tested several alternative response models such as a linear model and a semi-log model. We 
also estimated an S-shaped model that allows for saturation and extended our log-log model by a 
differential stimulus variable that captures any extra demand lift due to expenditure volatility (Simon 
1982). Based on the Schwartz Information Criterion and Davidson-McKinnon comparative test (Greene 
2006), we find that specification (10) best represents our data. 
Our brand sales model includes variables that are relevant to the international markets over the 
ten-year sample period. Specifically, it incorporates own and competitive marketing expenditures, 
including lagged effects. To account for substitution effects across categories within a therapeutic area, 
we treat brands from other categories as competitors. The coefficients associated with previous quarter’s 
own and competitive marketing expenditures capture lagged effects. This is consistent with prior findings 
that pharmaceutical marketing effects unfold over six months (Mizik and Jacobson 2004). In addition, 
seasonal dummies are used to capture sales dynamics, a trend variable (elapsed time since launch of a 
brand) is added to control for life-cycle effects, a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is used as a 
proxy of the overall economic condition of a country, and finally the autoregressive error term is added to 
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capture inertia in sales (Hanssens et al., 2001).2 We account for brand heterogeneity in demand, e.g., 
quality, brand equity, order of entry, by estimating brand-specific fixed effects. Distribution and price are 
not relevant variables in our context. In the European countries covered by our data, pharmacies are 
required to list every approved drug, resulting in 100% distribution for the drugs in our sample.  Prices 
were highly regulated during the observation period and therefore not used as a tactical marketing 
instrument. There is only meaningful cross-sectional variation in prices that is captured by the brand-
specific fixed effects. 
Estimation and Endogeneity Issues. We estimate the brand sales model (13) with generalized 
least squares (GLS) to account for the specific error structure. We also test whether marketing 
expenditures can be treated as exogenous variables. If not, estimates will be biased and alternative 
estimators such as instrumental variables (IV) estimators should be employed. The drawback of the IV 
estimator is that it yields less efficient results and thus reduces the power of our tests. 
The endogeneity of marketing expenditures could have several sources. A main source is the 
allocation of scarce marketing resources across brands at the portfolio level. Larger and more responsive 
brands tend to attract more marketing resources. In our empirical design, we effectively control for this 
endogeneity source by specifying brand-specific fixed effects. Since this may not be sufficient we also 
apply the Hausman-Wu test to our brand sales model. The test requires the use of instrumental variables. 
We considered cost-side instruments but were not able to obtain data for our observation period dating 
back 25 years. Following Azoulay (2002), we use the cumulative expenditures on a brand in countries 
other than the focal country as an instrument that identifies the potentially endogenous expenditure 
variable. Brand expenditures across countries are correlated because of allocation decisions by the firm. 
But expenditures in one country should not impact the demand for a drug in a different country. 
The validity of an instrument rests on the assumption that it is strongly correlated with the 
endogenous variable but not with the error term. We check for this in various ways.  First, R2 for the first-
stage regressions is high (on average, R2 > .40) and the F-value exceeds the threshold of 10 in 7 of 8 
markets suggesting that our instrument is strong (Greene 2006). Second, we acknowledge that our 
identifying assumption only holds if there are no common demand shocks for a brand across countries. 
The introduction of competitive brands could be a source for such a demand shock. During our 
observation period 1987-1996, firms usually used a waterfall strategy and introduced new drugs country 
by country with substantial delays. Hence, common demand shocks are unlikely to result from this 
                                                
2 We are aware of other dynamic specifications of pharmaceutical response models, such as the use of a lagged sales 
variable (e.g., Fischer and Albers 2010). For this specific dataset of the period 1987-1996, however, specification 
tests indicated that Equation (13) best represents the expenditure dynamics compared to other specifications (see 
Appendix for details).  Note also that (13) and a model with lagged sales variables, such as the Koyck model, are 
closely related to each other (see Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2001, Chapter 4).  
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source. In addition, we applied the Box-Jenkins procedure to decompose brand demand in other countries 
into its time-series components and isolate demand shocks. Neither the cross-country correlations of these 
shocks nor the correlations with the endogenous variables and instruments were significant. Third, since 
we can never be sure whether the exclusion restriction holds, we apply the procedure by Conley, Hansen, 
and Rossi (2012) to check for the sensitivity of IV estimation results when this restriction is relaxed. We 
find highly stable estimates for a wide range of relaxations, which strengthens our confidence in the 
validity of the chosen instrument. 
Based on the results of the Hausman-Wu test, we cannot reject the assumption of exogenous 
marketing expenditures in any of the 8 markets. Hence, we apply GLS to the data to avoid a loss in 
efficiency that would result from using IV estimation. Note that the same applies to the volatility models 
because endogeneity there arises only from endogeneity in brand sales models. 
 
Volatility Models 
Structural Equations.  Let V(REV) denote the volatility of revenues measured in terms of 
variance or range, respectively, V(MKT) represent the volatility of own marketing expenditures, A(MKT) 
be the average level of own marketing expenditures, V(CMKT) denote the volatility of competitive 
marketing expenditures, CORR represent the correlation between own and competitive marketing 
expenditures, RESP denote total marketing responsiveness (= α1ik + α2ik), X denote a vector including the 
remaining variables of the brand sales model as specified in Equation (13) (i.e., brand-fixed effects to 
control for order of entry, quality, etc., trend, seasonality, and GDP as a surrogate for general demand), γ  
be a parameter vector to be estimated, and ν be an error term with variance ξ. Omitting brand, country, 
and time subscripts for the moment, we specify the revenue volatility model as follows: 
 
(14) 
 We assume the relationship between revenue volatility and its drivers to be multiplicative. Thus 
the variables interact with each other, consistent with the results from the theoretical discussion. The 
correlation between own and competitive marketing expenditures and the estimated marketing 
responsiveness parameter appear as part of an exponential function because they may become negative. 
The parameters γ1-3 can be directly interpreted as elasticities and facilitate the comparison of volatility 
drivers. We subsequently describe how we transform the dataset to remove the X-variables and 
unobserved effects that are reflected by a brand-specific constant, which are not the focus in this study.  
 Since cash flows are constructed from revenues and costs, revenue volatility enters the cash-flow 
volatility equation: 
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  (15) 
where V(CF) denotes the volatility of cash flows, δ is a parameter vector to be estimated, and υ represents 
an error term with variance ψ. The effects of competitive-marketing-expenditure volatility, competitive 
reaction, marketing responsiveness, and X-variables on cash-flow volatility are mediated through revenue 
volatility. In addition, revenue volatility mediates the impact of own expenditures. Since own 
expenditures also enter the cash-flow equation as cost, we expect an additional direct effect on cash-flow 
volatility. Finally, note that specification (15) allows for a U-shaped influence of the level of marketing 
expenditures on cash-flow volatility, consistent with our proposition 2B. This situation occurs if δ3<0 and 
δ4>0. We further allow the error terms to be correlated across the two equations (14) and (15). 
 Data Transformation. By using the estimates of the brand sales model, we remove the effects of 
exogenous market factors such as seasonality, trend, and overall economic condition (measured by the 
GDP), and derive an adjusted unit-sales time-series for each brand. We multiply the unit sales with the 
brand's unit price and arrive at adjusted brand revenues. We then multiply the adjusted revenues by a cash 
contribution margin of 85% that is typical for original prescription drugs. From these gross cash flows we 
subtract the marketing expenditures and arrive at the final variable of adjusted brand cash flows. 
 The volatility of the adjusted revenues and cash flows is measured by the variance or range of 
these quantities over a time period of 8 quarters. Consequently, we use the first two available years of 
sales for each brand as an initialization period. We compute the volatility measure of the subsequent 
period by dropping the first period and including the information of the following period. We continue 
until the end of the brand-specific time series and thus obtain a time series of moving volatility measures 
of adjusted revenues and cash flows (moving-window analysis). This procedure is also applied to 
compute moving volatilities for own and competitive marketing expenditures and the moving average of 
own marketing expenditures.  We denote moving volatilities with MV and moving averages with MA. 
 The application of moving-window analysis is well established in the accounting literature (e.g., 
Kothari 2001) and is justified for two reasons. First, it increases sample size and therefore improves the 
power of statistical tests. Note that observations are inevitably lost due to the calculation of the volatility 
measures. Second, it accounts for possible dynamic effects.  Capital markets research has shown that it 
often takes some time until economic effects have fully materialized in earnings volatility. 
 Estimation Equations. The use of moving windows is helpful to increase the power of statistical 
tests due to the increase in degrees of freedom, but it is also likely to generate serially correlated errors in 
the time series of adjusted revenues and cash flows. We therefore transform expressions (14) and (15) 
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into a series of relative differences. By taking the total differentials of the log-transformed equations (14) 
and (15), we obtain (see Appendix for details): 
 (16) 
  (17) 
where, 
MV(AREV)ikt =  Moving volatility of adjusted revenues of brand i in country k and period t 
MV(MKT)ikt =  Moving volatility of marketing expenditures of brand i in country k and period t  
MA(MKT)ikt =  Moving average of marketing expenditures of brand i in country k and period t  
MV(CMKT)ikt =  Moving volatility of marketing expenditures of brand i’s competitors in country k 
and period t 
MA(CORR)ikt =  Moving average correlation between own and competitive marketing expenditures 
of brand i in country k and period t 
MV(ACF)ikt =  Moving volatility of adjusted cash flows of brand i in country k and period t 
Δ  =  First-difference operator.  
 Equations (16) and (17) represent the original equations (14) and (15) in terms of relative 
differences. Unlike absolute differences, this representation not only removes brand-specific fixed effects 
and reduces serial correlation, but also controls for brand-size effects. For example, bigger brands are 
expected to have larger absolute changes in revenues, cash flows and marketing spending. 
 Equations (16) and (17) establish an equation system with possibly correlated errors across 
equations. Revenue volatility is the only endogenous variable occurring at the right hand side of Equation 
(17). Thus, the system is recursive and GLS, which allows for cross-equation error correlation, provides 
efficient estimates (Zellner 1962). Since first differencing may not completely remove serial correlation, 
we also allow for equation-specific autocorrelation coefficients in the variance-covariance matrix. 
 The first-differencing procedure eliminates the time-invariant marketing responsiveness variable 
that is part of the revenue volatility model (14). To measure its influence, we linearize (14) first via log-
transformation and then build a cross-sectional regression model by obtaining averages of all time-
varying variables. The resulting equation can be estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, 
the marketing-responsiveness parameters of the first stage are measured with sampling error that vanishes 
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in the limit. As a consequence, OLS estimates from the second stage regression will be consistent but 
their standard errors may be biased (Murphy and Topel 1985). Following Nijs, Srinivasan, and Pauwels 
(2007), we obtain corrected standard errors by a bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 replications. First 
differencing also eliminates brand-specific factors such as quality that may explain different volatility 
levels among brands. Note that, together with the procedure to adjust revenues, we have therefore 
completely removed the impact of the X-variables of Equation (14) in our final estimation equations. 
 
Results 
Brand Sales Model 
The log-log brand sales model describes sales evolution in the markets very well. The average total 
marketing elasticity equals .10. If weighted by relative standard errors to account for estimation 
uncertainty it is .19, which is well in line with recently reported results (e.g., Fischer and Albers 2010). 
Albeit small, the impact of competitive marketing activities is negative, with a mean value of -.01. In 
general, there is substantial variation in the marketing responsiveness estimates, which we use as a 
predictor in our volatility models. Particularly, there are several brands/markets that face market-
expanding cross-effects. Recall that we use the total effect, which is the sum of current and lagged 
marketing responsiveness. 
 
Volatility Models  
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the revenue and cash-flow volatility models by using either 
(adjusted) variance or range as dependent variable. Our focal predictor variables explain a substantial part 
of variance in observed (i.e. unadjusted) revenue and cash-flow volatility in estimation and holdout 
samples, underlining the relevance of marketing activities for performance volatility. To form holdout 
samples we excluded the last four quarters (20% of total cases) in the first-difference models and the last 
20 brands (20% of cases) in the cross-sectional model. 
=== Insert Table 5 about here === 
In the following discussion we focus on variance as a volatility measure and on the results from 
first-difference models. Since the effect of marketing responsiveness, which does not vary within but 
across brands, can only be estimated by a cross-sectional model, we also report on the results of the cross-
sectional regression model. This model includes time-invariant control variables, such as order of entry, 
quality, average price, and average time in market. These controls, however, do not add explanatory 
power to the model (F4, 89=.158, p>.10). We note that, due to the missing time variation and the 
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substantially lower number of observations in this model, the effects for the time-varying variables should 
be interpreted with caution. 
 According to our propositions 1-4, the direction of volatility effects depends on estimated demand 
parameters (own and cross-effects) and the correlation and volatility of own and competitive marketing 
expenditures. We use the sample means of these quantities, together with the general conditions in Table 
1, to make predictions about the direction of the effects. These predictions hold for the average brand in 
our sample. They may be different for a specific brand depending on its set of parameter values. 
We first discuss  estimates from the revenue volatility model and then turn to the cash-flow 
volatility model. The volatility of marketing expenditures, measured by their variance, increases the 
volatility of revenues and supports our first prediction, with an estimated elasticity of .273 (p<.05). 
 The first-difference model also supports our second prediction on the influence of the level of 
marketing expenditures on revenue volatility; but the coefficient is not significant at p<.05. We obtain a 
significant negative effect from the cross-sectional regression (-1.99, p<.05).  Note that this variable has 
been divided by average brand unit sales in order to control for brand-size effects. The effect comes out 
stronger in a pure cross-sectional regression. 
 Marketing responsiveness drives revenue volatility (8.11, p<.05), supporting our third prediction.  
The associated elasticity of .811 (=8.11×.10) is substantial. The correlation of own and competitive 
marketing expenditures shows a significant negative effect on revenue volatility (-.262, p<.05). Since the 
average cross-effect is small but negative, i.e. εC < 0, this finding is consistent with our prediction (see 
Table 1 again). 
We find evidence for a negative effect of the volatility of competitive marketing expenditures on 
revenue volatility. The effect, however, is only marginally significant in the cross-sectional regression  
(-.222, p<.10). This result may seem counterintuitive, but is fully consistent with our theoretical analysis 
under both general conditions and rational firm behavior. Since we have a substitutive cross-effect  
(εC < 0), on average, a negative performance volatility effect arises if . The estimated 
average own and cross-effects in our sample are -.01 and .10. Using these values and further sample 
information from Table 3, we verify that .  
As expected, revenue volatility is an important driver of cash-flow volatility, with an elasticity of 
1.36 (p<.05). Its lower boundary value is the squared profit margin, which would be achieved if cash 
flows consisted only of revenues multiplied by the profit margin. The direct effect of the volatility of 
marketing expenditures is positive and significant, with a value of .535 (p<.05). This coefficient 
represents the volatility effect due to the cost component of marketing expenditures. In order to fully 
 εCCVC > −ρεCV
 −.01× .303> −.35× .10× .369
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evaluate the predicted effect of expenditure volatility on cash-flow volatility, we need to consider the total 
effect.  
Table 6 displays the total effects in terms of elasticity, which facilitates the interpretation and 
comparison of the magnitude of effects. The total effect of expenditure volatility on cash-flow volatility 
amounts to .906 (=1.36×.273+.535; p<.05). Hence, we find strong support for our prediction. 
Interestingly, this elasticity is more than three times higher than that for revenue volatility. We also find 
strong support for the expected U-shaped influence of the level of marketing expenditures on cash flows 
(-2.38, p<.05 and .003, p<.05; see table 6). The direction of the influence of marketing responsiveness on 
cash-flow volatility is also consistent with our prediction. Its elasticity is high, with a value of 1.10 
(p<.05). The volatility effect of the volatility of competitive marketing expenditures is not significant, 
which may be due to the fact that the estimated cross-effects are rather small and not uniform in sign 
across all categories. We find, however, support for the expected cash-flow volatility effect of the 
correlation of own and competitive marketing expenditures, though the associated elasticity is modest  
(-.123; p<.05). 
=== Insert Table 6 about here === 
Both Tables 5 and 6 also show the results for models when we take range instead of variance as a 
volatility measure. Overall, the results are consistent with the results using variance as a volatility 
measure. 
 
Robustness of Findings 
We performed several analyses to verify the robustness of these results. First, we varied the window of 
the volatility measures. Instead of 8 quarters we computed volatility measures based on 4 quarters and 12 
quarters. The results were similar but model fit deteriorated, underlining that the 8-quarter window is the 
best choice for our dataset. Second, we created volatility variables that do not overlap over time periods. 
For example, the first observation of an 8-quarter-based variance variable includes the first 8 quarters, the 
second observation is based on the subsequent 8 quarters, and so forth.  This procedure reduces the 
sample size to only 292 observations. The results did not change materially, though the standard errors 
increased. Third, we used the original instead of adjusted time-series for revenues and cash flows to 
compute volatility measures based on 8-quarter windows. The results are in line with the results from 
using adjusted time series. However, the standard errors are higher, which is likely due to the increased 
noise from exogenous market factors. Fourth, we calculated revenue-volatility elasticities based on the 
estimated demand parameters and Equation (4), i.e. without estimating the separate Equation (16). It turns 
out that these elasticity estimates are associated with relatively high standard errors. The results are 
basically the same as those obtained from (16) and shown in Table 6. None of the differences is 
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statistically significant and probably due to the estimation error. Finally, we verified whether the results 
are influenced by collinearity. The condition indices of the models were well below the critical value of 
30 (Greene 2006). 
 
Discussion 
Our findings contribute to the advancement of knowledge in marketing as well as general management. 
Volatility in brand revenues and cash flows has been overlooked in marketing for a long time. However, 
performance volatility may have substantial negative consequences for the firm, due to excess cost 
associated with the bullwhip effect or higher capital cost from holding larger cash reserves. Our study is 
the first to describe marketing’s potential to drive performance volatility in an analytic way. We do so by 
relying on extant market response theory, which allows us to make the formal connection between 
marketing spending, marketing responsiveness and revenue and cash-flow volatility. 
 The empirical application on a large dataset from the pharmaceutical industry supports the 
implications derived from the theoretical analysis.  We find broad support for the expected effects under 
real market conditions. Furthermore, the volatility effects are substantial in a managerial sense, as 
reflected by the elasticity magnitudes. 
 While these empirics support our propositions in one important sector of the global economy, 
replication in other industries would be needed in order to formulate empirical generalizations. We 
conjecture that the product and competitive setting will have a strong impact on the results. For example, 
some sectors rely on virtually continuous marketing pressure in order to protect a brand’s share of voice 
and achieve the brand’s sales goals, while other sectors have more sporadic marketing spending, e.g. on 
the occasion of new-product launches. All else equal, we would expect the volatility effects to be stronger 
in the second scenario.    
 
Managerial Implications 
Our study provides insights that invite marketing decision makers to think differently about the 
consequences of their actions. First, our analysis suggests that higher marketing spending volatility 
usually leads to a higher volatility of revenues as well as cash flows. The empirical results show that the 
effects are substantial, and thus should not be neglected.  Marketing managers who decide on the timing 
of media plans, promotion plans, product launches, etc. should be aware that their marketing decisions 
can influence the volatility of both their top-line and bottom-line performance. Since marketing 
expenditure costs grow faster than revenues, due to diminishing returns, their impact on cash-flow 
volatility is larger than on revenue volatility. Second, stronger market response parameters also translate 
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into higher volatility of revenues. Thus, on the one hand, larger response parameters are good news for 
the marketing manager because his/her expenditures produce higher sales. On the other hand, higher 
responsiveness has a dark side since it makes revenues and cash flows more volatile, even if spending 
volatility itself does not change. Third, we find that a higher mean level of marketing expenditures 
reduces revenue volatility, holding spending volatility constant. Higher spending also decreases the cash-
flow volatility for typical non-monotonic cash-flow distributions up to a certain level. Finally, the optimal 
budget under a volatile marketing policy should be higher than the optimal budget under an even-
spending policy, provided that marketing volatility does have an additional effect on sales. 
Can we derive general managerial recommendations from our study? Setting the optimal levels of 
marketing expenditures and volatility requires estimating the incremental cost and sales arising from 
larger revenue and cash-flow volatility (see Theorems 1 and 2 again).  This information may not be 
readily available for various reasons. In such situations, our theoretical and empirical results point to a 
few general recommendations, which we summarize below.  
 First, some marketing tactics, such as promotions and advertising campaigns, are used frequently 
and involve a volatile deployment of the marketing budget. Sometimes these tactics improve a brand’s 
top-line results, sometimes they do not, but in either case, we expect them to have an effect on the 
volatility of both revenues and cash flows. Since volatility may incur significant additional costs, even 
revenue-effective volatile marketing tactics may turn out to be harmful to the bottom line. This creates a 
managerial tradeoff. If the effect of marketing volatility on the level of revenues/cash flows is 
questionable and cannot be quantified at all, there is no need to increase marketing volatility, and in fact it 
should be avoided. If the effect on sales is supposedly high, managers need to find the right balance 
between that positive impact and its negative side effect and may use Theorem 2 as a reference. 
Second, and similarly, different brands have different levels of marketing spending and our 
results show that those with higher spending levels enjoy protection against performance volatility, 
especially cash-flow volatility, so long as their expenditures are economically reasonable, i.e. they are not 
too far beyond the optimal levels. Since deviations from the optimal budget level do not harm profits too 
much (as per the flat maximum principle), it seems reasonable to overspend rather than underspend. This 
is also supported by Theorem 1 to benefit from a potential sales impact of marketing volatility. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our research is subject to limitations that may stimulate future research.  First, we have quantified 
the magnitude of volatility drivers in 8 prescription-drug markets. It would be interesting to extend this 
analysis to other industries. Second, revenue and cash-flow volatility may arise, not only from marketing 
spending behavior, but also from specific marketing-mix activities such as promotions and new-product 
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introductions. The analytical models to analyze the effects of such activities may be different. Third, our 
analytical model provides general results on performance volatility effects and optimal mean expenditures 
and volatility. It would be interesting to develop a decision model that produces more specific insights 
into optimal volatile marketing policies. A key challenge for such a model is to estimate the cost of 
revenue volatility, such as those arising from the bullwhip effect. Another challenge is to correctly specify 
and estimate the demand model that suggests marketing volatility as an optimal policy.  
We hope our study will stimulate future research on the relationship between marketing mix 
variables, performance volatility and its financial consequences from diverse perspectives. Such 
integration will enable higher-quality resource allocation decisions, for the benefit of the enterprise. 
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TABLE 1 
Brand Performance Volatility Effects under General Conditions 
 Effect on brand performance volatility 
Due to… Variance of revenues Variance of cash flows 
Higher variance of 
marketing expenditures 
Positive if . 
Negative else. Positive if . 
Negative else. 
 
Higher level of marketing 
expenditures 
Negative if . 
Positive else. 
First negative, then positive  
(U-form) if . 
Positive else. 
 
Higher marketing 
responsiveness 
Positive if . 
Negative else. 
Positive if  and 
. 
Negative if 
.  
   
  
Variance of revenues and 
cash flows for 
 
Variance of revenues and 
cash flows for 
 εc < 0 εc > 0 
Higher variance of 
competitive marketing 
expenditures 
Positive if . 
Negative else. 
Positive if . 
Negative else. 
 
Stronger (positive) 
correlation between own 
and competitive marketing 
expenditures1) 
Always negative. Always positive. 
1) We note that in reality, competitive reaction occurs with a certain time lag that may lead to divergent correlation 
structures.  With quarterly data as ours, however, this effect vanishes and we should observe a positive correlation 
if expenditures are synchronized. 
  
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
> −ρ
εc CVc
ε CV
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
c cCV CVε ρ ε> − c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
 
µ < µ εCV + ρεc CVc( ) εCV
 
µ > µ εCV + ρεc CVc( ) εCV
c cCV CVε ρ ε< − c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
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TABLE 2 
Brand Performance Volatility Effects under Rational Firm Behavior 
 Effect on brand performance volatility 
Due to… Variance of revenues Variance of cash flows 
Higher variance of 
marketing expenditures 
Always positive. 
Positive if . 
Corollary 1 holds. 
 
Higher level of marketing 
expenditures 
Always negative. Always first negative, then positive 
(U-form). 
Corollary 2 holds. 
 
Higher marketing 
responsiveness 
Always positive. Always positive for low expenditure 
levels and negative for high levels 
(inverted U-form in expenditure 
level). 
  
 
Variance of revenues 
and cash flows for 
 
 
Variance of revenues and 
cash flows for 
 εc < 0 εc > 0 
Higher variance of 
competitive marketing 
expenditures 
ρ = 0 Always positive.  Always positive. 
ρ < 0 Always positive.  Positive or negative. 
ρ > 0 Positive or negative.  Always positive. 
 
 
Stronger (positive) 
correlation between own 
and competitive marketing 
expenditures1) 
      Always negative. Always positive. 
1) We note that in reality, competitive reaction occurs with a certain time lag that may lead to divergent correlation 
structures.  With quarterly data as ours, however, this effect vanishes and we should observe a positive correlation 
if expenditures are synchronized. 
 
  
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
> −ρ
εc CVc
ε CV
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics (Period = Quarter) 
Level variables Mean Std. dev.  Volatility variables Mean Std. dev. 
Unit sales in  daily 
dosages (,000) 
17,817 20,392  Moving variance of 
adjusted revenues in 
th. US$ 
7,524,430 40,764,000 
Revenues in  US$ 
(,000) 
9,342 10,400  Moving variance of 
adjusted cash flows in 
th. US$ 
3,310,330 17,186,000 
Cash flows in US$(,000) 5,022 6,385  Moving variance of 
marketing 
expenditures in th. 
US$ 
151,134 347,868 
Marketing expenditures 
in  US$ (,000) 
1,053 872  Moving variance of 
competitive marketing 
expenditures in th. 
US$ 
2,300,460 2,525,510 
Competitive marketing 
expenditures in  US$ 
(,000) 
5,008 3,390  Moving range of 
adjusted revenues in 
th. US$ 
3,754 6,749 
Moving average of 
marketing expenditures 
in  US$ (,000) 
960 732  Moving range of 
adjusted cash flows in 
th. US$ 
2,692 4,383 
Moving average 
correlation between own 
and competitive 
marketing expenditures 
0.35 0.40  Moving range of 
marketing 
expenditures in th. 
US$ 
854 756 
    Moving range of 
competitive marketing 
expenditures in th. 
US$ 
3,675 2,322 
Notes: All variables before log-transformation that is used in estimation. All values in 1996 dollars deflated by 
country-specific consumption price index. 
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TABLE 4 
T-test Results on Differences between Group Means in US$ (,000) 
  Group Means for Variance of 
Revenues 
 Group Means for Variance of Cash 
Flows 
 Expected 
difference 
 
Low1) 
 
High1) 
Difference 
(p-value) 
  
Low1) 
 
High1) 
Difference 
(p-value) 
Variance of 
marketing 
expenditures 
Low < 
High 1,672,517    4,331,894    .000   707,447    2,099,758    .000 
Level of 
marketing 
expenditures2) 
Low > 
High3) 2,455,130    1,934,147     .107   1,037,391    1,007,937    .830 
Marketing 
responsiveness 
Low < 
High 1,839,206    3,708,319     .000    876,018    1,513,152    .001 
Variance of 
competitive 
marketing 
expenditures 
Low > 
High4) 1,997,245    1,304,307     .000    907,069     660,641    .004 
Correlation 
between own 
and 
competitive 
marketing 
expenditures 
Low > 
High5) 3,131,701    1,587,563     .000   1,447,002     684,286    .000 
Notes: Test for difference between group means is based on two-sided t-tests that corrects for unequal group 
variances if necessary. 
1)  Brands are assigned to the „Low“ („High“) group if their mean for the respective predictor variable, e.g., variance 
of marketing expenditures, is below (above) the sample mean. Reported cell values reflect the group mean of the 
respective criterion variable, e.g., variance of revenues. 
2) Level of marketing expenditures was divided by the mean level of unit sales for a brand to account for brand size 
effects. 
3) Because the relationship between cash-flow variance and level of marketing expenditures is non-monotonic 
(inverted U-shape), we cannot make a prediction. We rather expect no difference between group means. 
4) Following propositions 3A and 3B, the predicted sign depends on sample characteristics such as the relation 
between own and cross-effects, which were estimated.  
5) Following propositions 4A and 4B, the predicted sign requires that cross-effects are substitutive, which is 
consistent with our estimate from the brand sales model. 
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TABLE 5 
Estimation Results for the Volatility Models 
  Revenue volatility Cash-flow volatility 
  First-difference model Cross-sectional model First-difference model 
 Expected 
sign 
 
Variance       Range 
Dependent variable 
Variance        Range 
 
Variance        Range 
Constant  - -11.120 
(9.70) 
-6.537 
(4.883) 
- 
Volatility of revenues 
 
+ - - 1.359 
(.029)*** 
1.155 
(.018)*** 
Volatility of marketing 
expenditures 
+ .273 
(.024)*** 
.101 
(.024)*** 
1.926 
(.699)*** 
2.214 
(.819)*** 
.535 
(.032)*** 
.227 
(.023)*** 
Level of marketing 
expenditures 
 
– -.245 
(.237) 
.139 
(.076) 
-1.9881) 
(.665)*** 
-1.0081) 
(.327)***  
-2.042 
(.369)*** 
-.307 
(.079)*** 
Exp(Level of marketing 
expenditures) 
+ - - .003 
(.001)*** 
.001 
(.000)*** 
Volatility of 
competitive marketing 
expenditures 
– -.006 
(.023) 
.018 
(.020) 
-.222 
(.143)* 
-.449 
(.285)* 
- 
Correlation between 
own and competitive 
marketing expenditures 
– -.262 
(.095)*** 
-.066 
(.026)** 
-2.337 
(3.19) 
-1.019 
(1.481) 
 
- 
Marketing 
responsiveness 
 
+ - 8.110 
(4.75)** 
3.974 
(2.078)** 
- 
Variance explained in 
estimation/holdout 
samples2) 
 .245/.202      .339/.215  .689/.209      .726/.277 .724/.585       .771/.721 
Total no. of 
observations 
 2,104 99 2,104 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. One-sided t-test applies to unidirectional expectations, two-sided t-tests 
otherwise. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
1)  Level of marketing expenditures was divided by the mean level of unit sales for a brand to account for brand size 
effects. 
2)  Variance in log-transformed focal volatility variable explained by predictor variables. Estimation sample includes 
80%, holdout sample 20% of cases. 
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TABLE 6 
Total Effects in Terms of Elasticity (When Applicable) 
 Expected  
sign 
Revenue 
Volatility 
 Cash-flow  
volatility 
Dependent variable variance       
Variance of marketing expenditures + .273 (.024)***  .906 (.070)*** 
Level of marketing expenditures1) – -.245 (.237)  -2.375 (.490)*** 
Exp(Level of marketing 
expenditures)1) 
+ -  .003 (.001)*** 
Marketing responsiveness2) + .811 (.474)**  1.102 (.645)** 
Variance of competitive marketing 
expenditures 
– -.006 (.023)  -.009 (.031) 
Correlation between own and 
competitive marketing expenditures2) 
– -.090 (.033)***  -.123 (.045)*** 
Dependent variable range       
Range of marketing expenditures + .101 (.024)***  .344 (.051)*** 
Level of marketing expenditures1) – .139 (.076)  -.147 (.118) 
Exp(Level of marketing 
expenditures)1) 
+    .001 (.000)*** 
Marketing responsiveness2) + .397 (.208)**  .459 (.240)** 
Range of competitive marketing 
expenditures 
– .018 (.020)  .021 (.023) 
Correlation between own and 
competitive marketing expenditures2) 
– -.023 (.009)***  -.026 (.010)*** 
Notes: (Approximated) standard errors in parentheses. Results are based on first difference models except for 
marketing responsiveness, which are based on cross-sectional models. *** p < .01; ** p < .05 
1)  For cash-flow volatility, results reflect parameters of a non-monotonic function, not elasticities. 
2)  Elasticities are not constant and are evaluated at sample means for responsiveness and expenditure correlations, 
respectively. 
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Technical Appendix  
 
Illustrative Example of Financial Cost of Spending Volatility 
This section illustrates the additional financial burden that may arise from a volatile advertising strategy.  
Consider a brand manager with a budget of $400,000 to be spent over the fiscal year (see Table A1). 
Under even spending we assume s/he invests $100,000 in marketing activities every quarter. Under the 
alternative volatile strategy, we assume $200,000 is spent in the first and third quarters, and zero is spent 
in the remaining two. Following the market response literature, we incorporate a carryover effect of 
marketing, i.e. sales do not drop immediately to their base level when expenditures are reduced to zero.  
The upper panel of Table A1 shows the statement of cash flows associated with the two spending 
strategies. Column 3 and 4 present the incremental revenues, net of costs of goods sold, which accrue 
from marketing expenditures.3 Consistent with the idea of the differential stimulus effect (Hanssens and 
Levien 1983; Simon 1982), incremental revenues are higher under alternating spending levels. The last 
two columns show the incremental cash flows (net revenues minus marketing expenditures). We assume 
that volatile spending generates cash flows that are 5% higher than those from even spending.4 
Normally, the comparison of the two alternative spending schedules would stop at this point. 
However, the alternatives involve quite different levels of volatility of incremental revenues and cash 
flows, as shown in the last two rows of the upper panel. Volatility can be expressed as the range of 
monetary quantities or their standard deviation. By definition, it is zero for even spending but reaches a 
remarkable level under volatile spending. The financial side effect associated with volatile spending is 
demonstrated in the lower panel of Table A1. 
Columns 1 and 2 show how cash flows accumulate over time until they reach their year-end total 
of $80,000 and $84,000, respectively. The accrual of cash flows is booked at the end of a quarter, for 
example, $20,000 is booked under even spending at the end of the first quarter. In order to realize these 
cash flows, however, capital must be provided at the beginning of the quarter. Columns 3 and 4 list the 
required level of cash holdings. It equals the size of marketing expenditures in the first quarter but 
decreases in subsequent quarters due to the incremental cash flows generated by marketing in previous 
periods. These required cash holdings are not costless, as investors expect their invested capital to 
generate at least a certain rate of return. Since the volatile spending pattern creates negative cash flows in 
some quarters, more capital is locked up over time. Compared with even spending, these higher capital 
                                                
3  The figures are generated by a typical market response function that accounts for carryover and differential 
stimulus effects. Marketing spending elasticity under even spending is assumed to be .30. 
4 Dubé, Hitsch, and Manchanda (2005) and Mahajan and Muller (1986) report gains in cash profits due to volatile 
spending are between 1% and 5%. 
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needs incur additional financing costs as shown in the last two columns. Assuming annual capital cost of 
15% or 3.8% per quarter, these financing costs make the volatile spending a less attractive policy. Cash 
flows net of financing cost now amount to $70,000 for even spending, but only $68,000 for the volatile 
spending strategy. 
 
Table A1 
An Example of the Financial Costs of Spending Volatility 
  Statement of cash flows (quarterly) in Thousand US$ 
  Marketing expenditures  Incremental revenues 
net of cost of goods due 
to marketing 
expenditures 
 Incremental cash flows 
due to marketing 
expenditures 
  Even 
spending 
Volatile 
spending 
 Even 
spending 
Volatile 
spending 
 Even 
spending 
Volatile 
spending 
Quarter 1  100 200  120 150  20 -50 
Quarter 2  100 0  120 92  20 92 
Quarter 3  100 200  120 150  20 -50 
Quarter 4  100 0  120 92  20 92 
Total  400 400  480 484  80 84 
Std. dev.  0 100  0 29  0 71 
Range1)  0 200  0 58  0 142 
   
Cash balance sheet (quarterly) in Thousand US$ 
  Cumulated cash flows due 
to marketing expenditures 
 Required cash holdings  Financing costs for 
capital lockup 
(3.8% per quarter) 
  Even 
spending 
Volatile 
spending 
 Even 
spending 
Volatile 
spending 
 Even 
spending 
Volatile 
spending 
Quarter 1  20 -50  100 200  4 8 
Quarter 2  40 42  80 50  3 2 
Quarter 3  60 -8  60 158  2 6 
Quarter 4  80 84  40 8  1 0 
Total     280 416  10 16 
1) Range = Maximum expenditure – Minimum expenditure 
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Proofs of Propositions of Brand Performance Volatility Effects 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1A. We need to show that 
( )
( )
,
0
Var RV MKT CMKT
Var MKT
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ >
∂
. Taking the first 
derivative of Equation (4) w.r.t. Var(MKT) and setting > 0 gives, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
222 2 0c c
Var CMKT
P Q P Q Q
Var MKT
µ ρ µ µ
⎡ ⎤
′ ′ ′+ >⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
,   (18) 
which we divide by P²Q'(µ) and rearrange to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cQ Var MKT Q Var CMKTµ ρ µ′ ′> − .    (19) 
Recall our expressions for elasticities, ε = Q' ⋅ µ/Q  and c c cQ Qε µ′= ⋅ , and coefficients of variation,  
CV = SD(MKT)/µ and CVc = SD(CMKT)/µc. Dividing (19) by Q and expanding the l.hs. with µ and the 
r.h.s. with µc produces 
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −  , 
which is equivalent to the condition in proposition 1A. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1B. We need to show that 
( ),
0
Var RV MKT CMKT
µ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ <
∂
. 
Taking the first derivative of Equation (4) w.r.t. µ and setting < 0 gives, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2 2 22 2 0c cP Q Q Var MKT P Q Q Var MKT Var CMKTµ µ ρ µ µ′′ ′ ′′ ′+ <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . (20) 
Note that Q''(µ) < 0. Dividing (20) by 2P²Q''(µ)Var(MKT) and rearranging the result gives 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )cQ Var MKT Q Var CMKTµ ρ µ′ ′> − ,   (21) 
which is equivalent to expression (19). As done before, we can transform this expression to 
 , 
which is equivalent to the condition in proposition 1B. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1C. We need to show that 
( )
( )
,
0
Var RV MKT CMKT
Q µ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ >
′∂
. 
Taking the first derivative of Equation (4) w.r.t. Q'(µ) and setting > 0 gives, 
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2 2 22 2 0c cP Q Var MKT P Q Var MKT Var CMKTµ ρ µ′ ′+ >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ,  (22) 
which we divide by P²Q'(µ)[Var(MKT)]1/2 and rearrange to 
,   (23) 
which is equivalent to expression (19). As done before, we can transform this expression to 
 , 
which is equivalent to the condition in proposition 1C. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2A. We need to show that 
( )
( )
,
0
Var CF MKT CMKT
Var MKT
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ >
∂
. Taking the 
first derivative of Equation (5) w.r.t. Var(MKT) and setting > 0 gives, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
22 21 0c c
Var CMKT
P C Q P C Q Q
Var MKT
µ ρ µ µ
⎡ ⎤
′ ′ ′− − + − >⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
.  (24) 
Selectively, we expand terms of (24) with Q, µ, and µc, respectively, to obtain  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
12 2 22
2 c
c
P C Q Var CMKTQP C
Var MKT
ε µ
ρεε
µµµ
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ > − − ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
.  (25) 
Dividing this expression by 
( )22 2
2
P C Qε
µ
−
gives, 
( )
( )
( )
( )
12
2
22 2
c
c
P C Q Var CMKT
Var MKTP C Q
ε µ ε µρ
ε µε
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ > − ⎢ ⎥
− ⎣ ⎦
.    (26) 
Substituting for the near-optimal expenditure level  µ  according to Equation (6) and the coefficients of 
variation, CV and CVc, we can write for (26) 
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
> −ρ
εc CVc
ε CV
, 
which is equivalent to the condition in proposition 2A. ¨ 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. We need to show that . From εc 
< 0 and ρ, ε, CV, CVc > 0, it follows k > 0. Assume expenditures are set at the optimal level, i.e. µ = µ*. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cQ Var MKT Q Var CMKTµ ρ µ′ ′> −
c cCV CVε ρ ε> −
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
< k,  where k = −ρ
εc CVc
ε CV
 
 
 
41 
Since , it follows with (6) that . Let  be an arbitrary 
constant that measures how close actual expenditures are to the optimal level: . For  
κ → 0, µ → µ* and . As a consequence,  and therefore, . Hence, 
there is a κ small enough to satisfy . ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2B. This proposition implies that the first derivative of (5) has a root. 
Hence, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
2
,
0
2 1
+2 .c c
Var CF MKT CMKT
P C Q P C Q Var MKT
P C Q Q Var MKT Var CMKT
µ
µ µ
ρ µ µ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ =
∂
′′ ′= − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
′′ ′− ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦     
(27) 
Dividing (27) by 0Q′′ < , expanding Q′  and cQ′  with Q, µ, and µc, respectively, and substituting terms 
for elasticities, coefficients of variation and  µ  from (6), we solve for the root 
 
µ0 = µ
ε CV + ρεc CVc
ε CV
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.     (28) 
Because c cCV CVε ρ ε> − , the root is defined for positive mean expenditure levels. For a  
U-shaped relation, we must show that ( )
0
, 0Var CF MKT CMKT µ µµ <∂ ∂ <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and 
( )
0
, 0Var CF MKT CMKT µ µµ >∂ ∂ >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Rewriting Equation (27) by substituting terms for 
elasticities, coefficients of variation and  µ , these inequalities imply 
 
µ
ε CV + ρεc CVc
ε CV
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− µ > 0  and
 
µ
ε CV + ρεc CVc
ε CV
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− µ < 0 , respectively. Let 0,  with 0.z zµ µ= >  Note that µ < µ0 for z < 1 and  
µ > µ0 for z > 1. Substituting µ0 for (28), we easily verify that ( ) 1 0zVar CF MKT µ <∂ ∂ <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and 
( ) 1 0zVar CF MKT µ >∂ ∂ >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .   
( )P C Qµ ε∗ ∗ ∗= −  µ = µ
∗ = ε∗ P −C( )Q∗  κ ∈
µ µ κ∗= −
 µ→ µ
∗
 
µ − µ → 0
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
κ→0
= 0
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
< k
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. Set µ = µ*, which implies with (6) that  µ = µ
∗ . Because 0cQ′ < and  
ρ > 0, ( ) 1c cCV CV CVε ρε ε+ < . Then, result (28) implies that µ0 < µ*. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2C. The derivative of (5) w.r.t. Q'(µ) is given by 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
2
,
2 1
2 .c c
Var CF MKT CMKT
P C P C Q Var MKT
Q
P C Q Var MKT Var CMKT
µ
µ
ρ µ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ′= − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦′∂
′+ − ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦     
(29) 
Note that Equation (27), the derivative of (5) w.r.t µ, equals Equation (29) scaled by ( )Q µ′′ . Hence, both 
derivatives have the same root, as given by Equation (28). However, because  ′′Q < 0 , the inequality 
conditions for  at µ < µ0 and µ > µ0, respectively, are reversed. 
Following the chain of proof for proposition 2B, we can prove that these inequalities hold. Specifically, 
 
∂Var CF MKT ,CMKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ∂ ′Q µ( ) µ<µ0 > 0 ⇒ µ < µ
ε CV + ρεc CVc
ε CV
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
,  with εCV > −ρεcCVc
and
∂Var CF MKT ,CMKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ∂ ′Q µ( ) µ>µ0 < 0 ⇒ µ > µ
ε CV + ρεc CVc
ε CV
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
,
 
which is equivalent to the conditions in proposition 2C. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3A. We need to show that 
( )
( )
,
0
Var RV MKT CMKT
Var CMKT
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ >
∂
. Taking the 
first derivative of Equation (4) w.r.t. Var(CMKT) and setting > 0 gives, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
222 2 0c c c c
Var MKT
P Q P Q Q
Var CMKT
µ ρ µ µ
⎡ ⎤
′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ + >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
, 
which we divide by P² to obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
22
0c c c c
Var MKT
Q Q Q
Var CMKT
µ ρ µ µ
⎡ ⎤
′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ + >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
.    (30) 
Consider first a substitutive cross-effect, i.e. ( ) 0c cQ µ′ <  and therefore εc < 0. Dividing (30) by 
( )c cQ µ′ and rearranging the result gives, 
( ) ( ),Var CF MKT CMKT Q µ′∂ ∂⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cQ Var CMKT Q Var MKTµ ρ µ′ ′< − .    (31) 
Dividing (31) by Q and expanding the l.hs. with µc and the r.h.s. µ, we can rewrite and simplify the 
inequality to  
c cCV CVε ρε< −  , 
which proves condition (7a) for proposition 3A. 
Consider now a market-expanding cross-effect, i.e. ( ) 0c cQ µ′ >  and therefore εc > 0. Divide (30) 
by and rearrange the result to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cQ Var CMKT Q Var MKTµ ρ µ′ ′> − .    (32) 
Again, we can rewrite this expression in terms of elasticities and coefficients of variation 
c cCV CVε ρε> −  , 
which proves condition (7b) for proposition 3A. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3B. We need to show that 
( )
( )
,
0
Var CF MKT CMKT
Var CMKT
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ >
∂
. Taking the 
first derivative of Equation (5) w.r.t. Var(CMKT) and setting > 0 gives, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
222 2 0c c c c
Var MKT
P C Q P C Q Q
Var CMKT
µ ρ µ µ
⎡ ⎤
′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤− + − >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
, 
which we divide by (P-C)² to obtain 
.    (33) 
Note that this inequality is identical to inequality (30). With inequalities (31) and (32), we already showed 
that the conditions (7a) and (7b) satisfy inequality (33). ¨ 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4A. The first derivative of Equation (4) w.r.t. ρ is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2 2
,
2 c c
Var RV MKT CMKT
P Q Q Var MKT Var CMKTµ µ
ρ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ′ ′= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂
 (34) 
Again, we can rewrite this expression in terms of elasticities and coefficients of variation 
( ) ( )2
,
2 c c
Var RV MKT CMKT
PQ CV CVε ε
ρ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ =
∂
.    (35) 
( )c cQ µ′
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
22
0c c c c
Var MKT
Q Q Q
Var CMKT
µ ρ µ µ
⎡ ⎤
′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤ + >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
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Since P, Q, ε, CV, and CVc are always strictly positive, it is easy to show that 
 
 
∂Var RV MKT ,CMKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂ρ
> 0   iff  εc > 0
and
∂Var RV MKT ,CMKT( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
∂ρ
< 0   iff  εc < 0.  
  
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4B. The first derivative of Equation (5) w.r.t. ρ is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
2
2
,
2 c c
Var CF MKT CMKT
P C Q Q Var MKT Var CMKTµ µ
ρ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ′ ′= − ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂
, 
which can be rewritten as 
( ) ( )2
,
2 c c
Var CF MKT CMKT
P Q CV CVε ε
ρ
∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ = −
∂
.  (36) 
Note that (P-C)² is always strictly positive. Following the chain of proof for proposition 4A, it is easy to 
show that proposition 4B also holds. ¨ 
 
Proofs of Brand Performance Volatility Effects under Rational Firm Behavior 
 
Table 2 summarizes the brand performance volatility effects that follow from our propositions if we 
assume that firms follow a rational, competitive Nash behavior. Note that Theorem 2 requires 
 ∂σ RV
2 ∂σ MKT
2 > 0  for any optimal, volatile marketing policy. Consistent with proposition 1A, this 
implies that  εCV > −ρεCCVC  always holds. In the following, we frequently refer to this result to prove 
the statements in Table 2. 
 
Impact of Own Marketing on Performance Volatility 
PROOF OF EFFECTS ON VARIANCE OF REVENUES. Since  εCV > −ρεCCVC  the statements in Table 
2 directly follow from propositions 1A, 1B, and 1C. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF THE EFFECT OF EXPENDITURE VARIANCE ON VARIANCE OF CASH FLOWS. From 
 εCV > −ρεCCVC , it follows  
−ρ
εCCVC
εCV
<1. Proposition 2A states that cash-flow variance increases 
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with expenditure variance if 
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
> −ρ
εCCVC
εCV
. Hence, a higher variance of own marketing 
expenditures always increases the variance of cash flows if 
 
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
≥1 . However, there may exist a 
budget that satisfies 
 
0 ≤
µ − µ
µ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
≤1, which proves the result in Table 2. Since the result in Table 2 is 
fully consistent with proposition 2A, the proof for corollary 1 given above applies here, too. Thus, 
corollary 1 holds under the assumption of rational firm behavior. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF THE EFFECT OF LEVEL OF EXPENDITURES ON VARIANCE OF CASH FLOWS. Since 
 εCV > −ρεCCVC  the statement in Table 2 directly follows from proposition 2B. For this reason, the 
proof of corollary 2 also applies here. Thus, corollary 2 holds under the assumption of rational firm 
behavior. ¨ 
 
PROOF OF THE EFFECT OF RESPONSIVENESS ON VARIANCE OF CASH FLOWS. Since  
 εCV > −ρεCCVC  the statement in Table 2 directly follows from proposition 2C. ¨ 
 
Impact of Competitive Marketing on Performance Volatility 
PROOF OF THE EFFECT OF COMPETITIVE EXPENDITURE VARIANCE ON VARIANCE OF REVENUES 
AND CASH FLOWS. Consider first the case of substitutive cross-effects, i.e. εC < 0. To demonstrate a 
positive effect of competitive expenditure variance on variance of revenues and cash flows, we need to 
show that the following inequalities are both satisfied: 
 εCCVC < −ρεCV  (see condition 7a)     (37) 
and  
 εCV > −ρεCCVC .      (38) 
Because ε, CV, and CVC > 0, these inequalities are always satisfied for ρ ≤ 0. For ρ > 0, we 
rearrange (37) to 
 
− 1
ρ
εCCVC > εCV . Then 
 
− 1
ρ
εCCVC > −ρεCCVC      (39) 
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must hold to satisfy (38). Recall that εC < 0 and ρ > 0. (39) can be simplified to  −1 ρ < −ρ  and therefore
 ρ
2 <1 , which is always satisfied because  0 < ρ ≤1 . Hence, a positive effect is consistent with  
ρ > 0. However, we can easily choose reasonable parameter values that are also consistent with a negative 
effect. Here, inequalites 
 εCCVC > −ρεCV        (40) 
and (38) must both be satisfied. Assume ε = .19, εC = -.05, ρ = .35, CV = .365, CVC = .303 and insert these 
parameter values into (40) and (38) to demonstrate that the inequalities are satisfied. ¨  
Consider now the case of market-expanding cross-effects, i.e. εC > 0. For a positive effect of 
competitive expenditure variance on variance of revenues and cash flows, inequality (38) together with 
 εCCVC > −ρεCV  (see condition 7b)     (41) 
must be satisfied. Again, it is straightforward to show that these inequalities are always satisfied for 
ρ ≥ 0 because ε, CV, and CVC > 0. For ρ < 0, we rearrange (41) to 
 
− 1
ρ
εCCVC < εCV . From this, we 
conclude that 
 
− 1
ρ
εCCVC > −ρεCCVC       (42) 
satisfies (38). Recall that εC > 0 and ρ < 0. (42) can be simplified to  −1 ρ > −ρ  and therefore ρ
2
<1 , 
which is always satisfied because  −1≤ ρ < 0 . Hence, a positive effect is consistent with  
ρ < 0. But again, we can easily choose reasonable parameter values that are consistent with a negative 
effect. For example, the parameter values ε = .19, εC = .03, ρ = -.35, CV = .365, CVC = .303 satisfy both 
(38) and the reverse of inequality (41). ¨ 
 
PROOF OF THE EFFECT OF EXPENDITURE CORRELATION ON VARIANCE OF REVENUES AND CASH FLOWS. 
The relationship between expenditure correlation and variance of revenues and cash flows depends on the 
sign of the cross-effect. The results in Table 2 are fully consistent with the results in Table 1 that are 
derived from propositions 4A and 4B. We have shown above that these propositions hold. ¨ 
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Proofs of Theorems on Optimal Expenditure Behavior 
Proof of Theorem 1 
Expression (8) states the maximization problem that we want to solve. Define  that 
measures the profit margin in percent. We can then write for the cash flows 
      (43) 
and derive their variance 
 . (44) 
Note that , where ρQ,MKT measures the correlation between unit sales 
and marketing expenditures. Using this relation and , we can write for (44) 
 . (45) 
Insert this expression into the profit function (8) to obtain: 
 
max
µ ,σ MKT
2
Π = P −C( )Q µ,σ MKT2 ,CMKT( )− µ − w+ rm2( )σ RV2 − r σ MKT2 + 2rmρQ ,MKT σ Q2σ MKT2( )− f . (46)  
For this maximization problem, we derive the first-order conditions (9a) and (9b) that each competitor has 
to satisfy under Nash competition. 
Assuming r = 0, the first-order conditions reduce to 
,      (47a) 
.     (47b) 
Multiply (47a) with µ and expand terms with Q and , respectively, to obtain 
,     (48a) 
where  and . Similarly, we multiply (47b) with  and expand 
terms with Q and , respectively, and obtain 
,     (48b) 
 m = P −C( ) P
 CF = m ⋅ PQ − MKT
 
σ CF
2 = m2P2σ Q
2 +σ MKT
2 − 2mPCov Q, MKT( )
 
Cov Q, MKT( ) = ρQ ,MKT σ Q2σ MKT2
 
σ RV
2 = P2σ Q
2
 
σ CF
2 = m2σ RV
2 +σ MKT
2 − 2mPρQ ,MKT σ Q
2σ MKT
2
 
∂Π
∂µ
= P −C( ) ∂Q∂µ −1− w
∂σ RV
2
∂µ
= 0
 
∂Π
∂σ MKT
2 = P −C( ) ∂Q∂σ MKT2
− w
∂σ RV
2
∂σ MKT
2 = 0
 σ RV
2
 
∂Π
∂µ
= P −C( )εQ ,µQ − µ − wεσ RV2 ,µσ RV
2 = 0
 
εQ ,µ =
∂Q
∂µ
µ
Q  
ε
σ RV
2 ,µ
=
∂σ RV
2
∂µ
µ
σ RV
2  σ MKT
2
 σ RV
2
 
∂Π
∂σ MKT
2 = P −C( )εQ ,σ MKT2 Q − wεσ RV2 ,σ MKT2 σ RV
2 = 0
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where  and . 
Setting (48a) = (48b), we can solve for the optimal expenditure level  
,    (49) 
where the asterisk means that variables are at their optimum. Rearranging terms shows that (49) is 
equivalent to Theorem 1. ¨ 
 
Proof of Theorem 2 
Solve expression (48a) for the revenue volatility 
   (50) 
and substitute for the optimal expenditure level (49) to obtain the revenue volatility at optimum 
.    (51) 
Substitute for  in (51) and solve for the optimal variance of marketing 
expenditures 
 .    (52)  
Since variances are always positive,  must hold for (52), which is consistent with 
Theorem 2. ¨ 
 
 
Proofs for Dynamic Model Extensions 
 
Proofs of Propositions of Brand Performance Volatility Effects 
Note that the structure of the general response function (1) and thus the variance functions of revenues 
and cash flows does not change if we substitute own and competitive marketing expenditures, MKT and 
CMKT, for their stock variables S and SC, respectively.  As a result, all brand performance volatility 
effects for the dynamic model are identical to their counterparts that we derived and proved for the static 
 
ε
Q ,σ MKT
2 =
∂Q
∂σ MKT
2
σ MKT
2
Q  
ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2 =
∂σ RV
2
∂σ MKT
2
σ MKT
2
σ RV
2
 
µ∗ = P −C( )Q∗εQ ,µ∗ −
ε
σ RV
2 ,µ
∗ P −C( )Q∗εQ ,σ MKT2
∗
ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2
∗
 
σ RV
2 =
P −C( )εQ ,µ − µ
wε
σ RV
2 ,µ
 
σ RV
2( )∗ =
P −C( )Q∗εQ ,σ MKT2
∗
wε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2
∗
 
ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2
 
∂σ RV
2
∂σ MKT
2
σ MKT
2
σ RV
2
 
σ MKT
2( )∗ = P −C( )Q
∗
w
ε
Q ,σ MKT
2
∗
∂σ RV
2 ∂σ MKT
2
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
 ∂σ RV
2 ∂σ MKT
2 > 0
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model. The only difference is that the variance, the mean, and the responsiveness are expressed in terms 
of marketing stocks instead of marketing expenditures. 
To prove that all propositions and corollaries also hold with respect to marketing expenditures, it 
is sufficient to show that the variance, the mean, and the responsiveness of expenditures differ from their 
stock equivalents only by a scaling factor.  All results hold for competitive marketing stock and 
expenditures, as well. 
MEAN. Taking the expectation of the marketing stock equation (10) gives 
  E St( ) = λE St−1( ) + E MKT( ) .  (53) 
Since λ < 1, the mean E(St) is identical for all values of t. The above expression can be rearranged to  
 
 
E S( ) = µ1− λ ,  (54) 
where µ denotes the mean of own marketing expenditures. This result shows that the mean of own 
marketing stock is identical with the mean of its expenditures up to the scale 1/1-λ. ¨ 
VARIANCE. We arrange (10) to 
  St − λSt−1 = MKTt   
and take the variance of both sides 
  Var St( ) + λ 2Var St−1( )− 2λρAR1SD St( )SD St−1( ) =Var MKTt( ) ,  (55) 
where ρAR1 measures the autocorrelation of the stock and all other terms are defined as earlier. Since 
SD(St) − SD(St-1) → 0 for longer time-series of S, we can use SD(St) ≅ SD(St-1) and simplify (55) to  
 . (56) 
The denominator of (56) is a constant and always greater than zero. To see that note that the following 
inequality must be met 
 
 
1+ λ 2
2λ
> ρAR1 .  
Since ρAR1 cannot take on values greater than 1 we can rearrange this inequality to  
1− λ 2( ) > 0 , which is 
always true. ¨ 
  RESPONSIVENESS. From the econometric literature on distributed-lag models (Hanssens, Parsons, 
and Schultz 2001), it is well established that short-term and long-term sales effects relate to each other as 
follows 
 
Var S( ) = 1
1+ λ 2 − 2λρAR(1)
Var MKT( )
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′QS ⋅( ) =
′Q ⋅( )
1− λ
.  (57)  
 Hence, sales responsiveness w.r.t. stock is identical to the sales responsiveness w.r.t. 
expenditures up to the scale of 1/1-λ. ¨ 
In addition, the conditions that are part of the propositions and summarized in Table 1 and 2 only 
change by a scaling factor. They can be rewritten by simply substituting 
 
εCV   for  εCV 1
1+ λ 2 − 2λρAR1,S
 , 
 
εCCVC   for  εCCVC
1
1+ λC
2 − 2λCρAR1,SC
, 
and 
 
ρ   for  ρS ,SC , 
where λC denotes the carryover coefficient of competitive marketing expenditures and  
ρS ,SC  measures the 
correlation between own marketing stock and competitive marketing stock. ¨ 
 
Proofs of Theorems on Optimal Expenditure Behavior 
 EXTENSION OF THEOREM 1. The firm faces the following dynamic profit maximization problem 
 
 
max
MKT ,σ MKT
2
e−dt P −C( )Q S ,SC ,σ MKT2( )− MKT − wσ RV2 − rσ CF2 − f⎡⎣ ⎤⎦dt0
∞
∫  (58) 
subject to 
 
 
dS
dt
= −φS + MKT , (59) 
with  
  MKT ≥ 0,   σ MKT
2 ≥ 0,   S ≥ 0,   and  S 0( ) = S0 . (60) 
Equation (59) describes the dynamic process for the evolution of the marketing stock (Nerlove 
and Arrow 1962), where φ is the depreciation rate of the stock. Note that time enters the objective 
function (58) explicitly through the discount term e-dt, with discount rate d and 0  < d < ∞. Since the 
discount rate is a constant the problem is quasiautonomous. Given the infinite time horizon, the solution 
to S(t) is likely to tend to a steady state in the long run (Kamien and Schwartz 1991, 95f). 
 Using (59) and assuming again r = 0, we can restate the maximization problem as follows 
 
max e−dt P −C( )Q S ,SC ,σ MKT2( )− dSdt −φS − wσ RV
2 − f⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥dt0
∞
∫ .  (61) 
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The first-order conditions are given by the Euler equation 
 
 
∂F
∂S
t,S∗ t( ), dS
∗ t( )
dt
, σ MKT
2( )∗⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
− d
dt
∂
∂ dS dt( ) F t,S
∗ t( ), dS
∗ t( )
dt
, σ MKT
2( )∗⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
= 0  (62a) 
 
 
∂F
∂σ MKT
2 = 0 , (62b) 
where 
 
F t,S∗ t( ),dS∗ t( ) dt , σ MKT2( )∗( )  is the integrand and the asterisk indicates that variable values are 
at their optimum. Under Nash competition, each competitor has to satisfy these first-order conditions. The 
needed derivatives are given by 
 
 
∂F
∂S
= e−dt P −C( ) ∂Q∂S −φ − w
∂σ RV
2
∂S
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥  , (63a) 
 
 
∂F
∂ dS dt( ) = −e
−dt , (63b)  
 
 
d
dt
∂F
∂ dS dt( ) = de
−dt  . (63c) 
By using (63a) and (63c), we can write for (62a) and (62b) 
 
 
P −C( ) ∂Q∂S −φ − w
∂σ RV
2
∂S
− d = 0 , (64a) 
 
 
P −C( ) ∂Q
∂σ MKT
2 − w
∂σ RV
2
∂σ MKT
2 = 0 . (64b)  
Consider first expenditure volatility, which appears only in the integrand, and first-order 
condition (64b). Multiply the expression with  and expand the first term with Q to obtain 
 . 
Solve the equation for  to obtain 
 , (65) 
with . Solution (65) is consistent with Theorem 2. ¨ 
 
 σ MKT
2
 
P −C( )QεQ ,σ MKT2 − w
∂σ RV
2
∂σ MKT
2 σ MKT
2( ) = 0
 
σ MKT
2( )∗
 
σ MKT
2( )∗ = P −C( )Q
∗
w
ε
Q ,σ MKT
2
∗
∂σ RV
2 ∂σ MKT
2
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
 ∂σ RV
2 ∂σ MKT
2 > 0
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THEOREM 1. Multiply (64a) with S and expand terms with Q and  σ RV
2 , respectively, to obtain 
 
 
P −C( )QεQ ,S − wεσ RV2 ,Sσ RV
2 − φ + d( )S = 0 , (66) 
where 
 
εQ ,S =
∂Q
∂S
S
Q
 and 
 
ε
σ RV
2 ,S
=
∂σ RV
2
∂S
S
σ RV
2 . Similarly, multiply (64b) with  and expand terms 
with Q and , respectively, and obtain 
 
 
P −C( )QεQ ,σ MKT2 − wεσ RV2 ,σ MKT2 σ RV
2 = 0 , (67) 
where  and . 
 Rearrange (66) and (67) to 
 
P −C( )QεQ ,S − φ + d( )S
ε
σ RV ,S
2
= wσ RV
2  ,     (68) 
 
P −C( )QεQ ,σ MKT2
ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2
= wσ RV
2 .     (69) 
 Setting (68) = (69), we can solve for the optimal stock 
 
 
S∗ =
P −C( )Q∗ εQ ,S∗
φ + d
−
ε
σ Rv
2 ,S
∗ P −C( )Q∗ εQ ,σ MKT2
∗
φ + d( )εσ RV2 ,σ MKT2
∗ . (70) 
The solution establishes a global maximum because the integrand  is 
concave in S*(t) and dS*(t)/dt. In addition, we do not need a necessary transversality condition in infinite 
horizon problems (Kamien and Schwartz 1991, 95f). 
Given  φS = MKT − dS dt , we multiply (70) with φ  to obtain 
 
 
MKT ∗ =
P −C( )Q∗ εQ ,MKT∗
φ + d
−
ε
σ RV ,MKT
2
∗ P −C( )Q∗ εQ ,σ MKT2
∗
φ + d( )εσ RV2 ,σ MKT2
∗ +
dS∗
dt
, (71)  
where 
 
εQ ,MKT
2 = φεQ ,S
2  and 
 
ε
σ RV
2 ,MKT
= φε
σ RV
2 ,S
. Since the optimal solution is a steady-state solution in an 
autonomous problem with infinite horizon, dS*/dt measures the deviations of optimal marketing 
expenditures around their long-term equilibrium level, i.e. around the optimal mean expenditure level 
 
µlong−term
∗ . The optimal variance of marketing expenditures and thus dS*/dt is given by expression (65). 
 σ MKT
2
 σ RV
2
 
ε
Q ,σ MKT
2 =
∂Q
∂σ MKT
2
σ MKT
2
Q  
ε
σ RV
2 ,σ MKT
2 =
∂σ RV
2
∂σ MKT
2
σ MKT
2
σ RV
2
 
F t,S∗ t( ),dS∗ t( ) dt , σ MKT2( )∗( )
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Since dS*/dt = 0 for the optimal mean expenditure level,  
µlong−term
∗ , expression (71) reduces to the 
extended form of Theorem 1 in (12). ¨ 
  
 
Derivation of Estimation Equations 
In this section, we derive the estimation equations (16) and (17) from equations (14) and (15). We start 
with a log transformation of equations (14) and (15), 
 
lnV REV( ) = lnγ 0 + γ 1 lnV MKT( ) + γ 2 ln A MKT( ) + γ 3 lnV CMKT( ) + γ 4CORR +
γ 5RESP + Xγ +ν ,
 (72) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4ln ln ln ln ln .V CF V REV V MKT A MKT A MKTδ δ δ δ δ υ= + + + + +  (73) 
Then we take the total differentials to obtain, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
3
4 5
1
,
dV REV dV MKT dA MKT
V REV V MKT A MKT
dV CMKT dCORR dRESP d
V CMKT
γ γ
γ γ γ ν
= +
+ + + + +dXγ
 (74) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
31 2
4
1
,
dV CF dV REV dV MKT dA MKT
V CF V REV V MKT A MKT
dA MKT d
δδ δ
δ υ
= + +
+ +
 (75) 
which define the structural form of our estimation equations (16) and (17). 
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Alternative Model Estimation Results 
In this section, we provide a summary of results of alternative brand sales model estimations and the 
correlation matrix of variables. 
Note that the estimation of our suggested brand sales model (Equation 13) is based on a fixed-
effects model with brand-specific effects for own and competitive marketing expenditures. Estimation of 
the alternative partial adjustment and Koyck specifications requires transforming the data into first 
differences. These models include the lagged dependent variable among predictor variables whose effect 
can only be consistently estimated in a first-difference panel data model (Greene 2006). Since the lagged 
difference of sales is still correlated with the differenced error term it needs to be instrumented. Values for 
sales lagged by two or three periods, respectively, provide valid instruments (Greene 2006). However, 
they further reduce the sample size and may turn out to be weak instruments. Finally, we note that 
because of the inherent differences between model specifications comparisons of model fit in terms of 
Pseudo R2 (for first differences of the dependent variable) are limited. 
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TABLE A2 
Overview of Estimation Results of Alternative Brand Sales Model Specifications 
 
 
France Gastro-intestinal categories  Cardio-vascular categories 
 Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b)  Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b) 
Average effect of own marketing 
expenditures .14 .07 .13 .20 .16  .02 .04 .01 .03 .01 
Average effect of competitive marketing 
expenditures .11 .06 .04 .05 .05  -.04 .03 .02 -.02 -.03 
Effect of lagged sales n.a. .66* (.31) 
.68* 
(.31) 
.32** 
(.11) 
.35** 
(.10)  n.a. 
.59** 
(.10) 
.59** 
(.10) 
.49** 
(.06) 
.45** 
(.06) 
Pseudo-R2 .87 .39 .39 .37 .39  .90 .33 .34 .47 .46 
 
Germany Gastro-intestinal categories  Cardio-vascular categories 
 Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b)  Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b) 
Average effect of own marketing 
expenditures .16 .15 .06 .17 .16  .00 -.01 -.01 .00 .02 
Average effect of competitive marketing 
expenditures -.01 .03 .01 .02 .02  .02 .03 .02 .00 .04 
Effect of lagged sales n.a. .69** (.19) 
.74** 
(.19) 
.34* 
(.15) 
.39** 
(.14)  n.a. 
.65** 
(.11) 
.65** 
(.10) 
.50** 
(.06) 
-.29 
(.51) 
Pseudo-R2 .45 .08 .03 .45 .20  .91 .14 .15 .48 .45 
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Table A2 (continued) 
 
Italy Gastro-intestinal categories  Cardio-vascular categories 
 Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b)  Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b) 
Average effect of own marketing 
expenditures .03 .02 .08 .01 .00  .08 .16 .12 .12 .13 
Average effect of competitive marketing 
expenditures -.01 -.09 -.06 -.07 -.06  -.02 .08 .09 .03 .04 
Effect of lagged sales n.a. .12 (.42) 
.20 
(.28) 
.04 
(.33) 
.17 
(.19)  n.a. 
.10 
(.31) 
.11 
(.31) 
-.13 
(.39) 
.26** 
(.05) 
Pseudo-R2 .60 .22 .37 .32 .31  .93 .15 .15 .27 .24 
 
UK Gastro-intestinal categories  Cardio-vascular categories 
 Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b)  Eq. 13 
Partial 
(a) 
Partial 
(b) 
Koyck 
(a) 
Koyck 
(b) 
Average effect of own marketing 
expenditures .03 .01 -.05 .03 .00  
.00 .03 .04 .02 .02 
Average effect of competitive marketing 
expenditures -.01 .03 .03 -.02 -.01  
.00 .01 -.03 .00 -.01 
Effect of lagged sales n.a. .85** (.18) 
.85** 
(.17) 
.52** 
(.10) 
.51** 
(.11)  n.a. 
.43** 
(.08) 
.43** 
(.09) 
.52** 
(.06) 
.52** 
(.04) 
Pseudo-R2 .62 .20 .29 .69 .68  .89 .60 .60 .60 .64 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test applies. ** p < .01; * p < .05. Pseudo R2 is the squared correlation between predicted and actual values of 
the dependent variable. Standard R2 is not defined for GLS and IV estimation approaches, which were used for estimating the models. 
The estimates of effects for own and competitive marketing expenditures represent average total effects across brands. Therefore, standard errors are not 
presented here. 
Model specifications:  Eq. 13  = Brand sales model with serial error correlation structure as of Equation (13) 
   Partial (a) = Partial adjustment model with current + lagged own and competitive marketing effects (no serial error correlation). 
   Partial (b) = Partial adjustment model with only current own and competitive marketing effects (no serial error correlation). 
   Koyck (a) = Koyck model with current + lagged own and competitive marketing effects (serial error correlation). 
   Koyck (b) = Koyck model with only current own and competitive marketing effects (serial error correlation).  
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TABLE A3 
Correlation Matrix (Moving Variances and Moving Averages based on 8 Quarter Window) 
 Variance of 
Revenues 
Variance of 
Cash Flows 
Variance of 
marketing 
expenditures 
Level of 
marketing 
expenditures 
Marketing 
responsiveness 
Variance of 
competitive 
marketing 
expenditures 
Correlation 
between own 
and competitive 
marketing 
expenditures 
Variance of 
Revenues 
1       
Variance of Cash 
Flows 
.965*** 1      
Variance of 
marketing 
expenditures 
.238*** .383*** 1     
Level of 
marketing 
expenditures1) 
.344***,1) .384***,1) .603***,1) 1    
Marketing 
responsiveness 
.072*** .062*** .050** .085*** 1   
Variance of 
competitive 
marketing 
expenditures 
-.045** -.03 .064*** .168*** -.139*** 1  
Correlation 
between own and 
competitive 
marketing 
expenditures 
-.086*** -.115*** -.065*** -.051** .130*** .014 1 
Notes: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
1) Note that this variable is not corrected for brand size. Larger brands have higher expenditure levels that involve larger variance.
 
 
 
58 
References 
Dubé, Jean-Pierre, Günter J. Hitsch, and Puneet Manchanda (2005), "An Empirical Model of Advertising 
Dynamics," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 3, 107-144. 
Greene, William H. (2006), Econometric Analysis. 6th ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Fischer, Marc and Sönke Albers (2010), “Patient- or Physician-Oriented Marketing: What Drives Primary 
Demand for Prescription Drugs?,” Journal of Marketing Research, 47 (1), 103-121. 
Hanssens, Dominique M. and Henry A. Levien (1983), “An Econometric Study of Recruitment 
Marketing in the U.S. Navy,” Management Science, 29, 1167-1184. 
Hanssens, Dominique M., Leonard J. Parsons, and Randall L. Schultz (2001), Market Response Models, 
Econometric and Time Series Analysis. 2nd ed., Boston et al.: Kluwer Academic Publisher. 
Kamien, Morton I. and Nancy L. Schwartz (1991), Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations 
and Optimal Control in Economics and Management. 2nd ed. North-Holland: Elsevier. 
Mahajan, Vijay and Eitan Muller (1986), "Advertising Pulsing Policies for Generating Awareness for 
New Products," Marketing Science, 5, 89-106. 
Simon, Hermann (1982), "ADPULS: An Advertising Model with Wearout and Pulsation," Journal of 
Marketing Research, 19, 352-363. 
